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Abstract 
Anne Carson’s Autobiography of Red (1998) is a text that traverses the boundaries between 
postmodernism and mythology. As such, it investigates and builds further upon its own 
mythological foundations, rooted in the poem Geryoneis by the ancient Greek poet Stesichoros. 
The aim of this study is to explore, through a close reading of Carson’s text, how we can move 
from thinking about mythology solely in terms of representation towards thinking of mythology 
in terms of simulation. This argument will be made by taking a semiotic approach. This approach 
not only makes a diachronic study of mythological language possible, but also makes it possible 
for us to think about how signs traverse (spatially) between different sign systems.  
The study starts by using René Girard’s approach of reading myths as texts of persecution in 
order to uncover Autobiography of Red’s underlying ideological codes. Linda Hutcheon’s theories 
concerning historiographic metafiction and parody are then used in order to explore how Carson, 
in using syllogistics, investigates the origins of the supposed blinding of Stesichoros by Helen of 
Troy. The study then moves on to a diachronic study of the sign systems in the text using Roland 
Barthes’ theory concerning myth as well as his metalingual system. The final chapter of this study 
starts out by conceptualizing a notion of textual space, following Barthes’ distinction between 
‘work’ and ‘Text’ and Gilles Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s philosophy of smooth and striated 
space. After having conceptualized textual space, a diagrammatic and simulative function of 
mythology is theorized. 
 
Keywords: Autobiography of Red, mythology, semiotics, postmodernism, post-structuralism, 
textual space, simulation 
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Introduction 
 
When I set out to write this thesis, I was originally interested in investigating the nature of 
mythology. I wanted to explore how mythology was produced (and whether we could speak of 
the ‘production of mythology’ in the first place), and what made something ‘mythological’. Of 
course, I am not the first person (nor the last) to pose these questions. In his extensive study The 
Poetics of Myth (1998) the Russian literary scholar Eleazar Meletinsky traces the development of 
mythology in order to uncover its specific characteristics. Meletinsky states that mythological 
thought originated in the inability of primitive peoples to differentiate themselves from the 
natural world, and as such projected human qualities onto natural objects, which gave these 
objects a social dimension (152). This social dimension allows for a space where metaphysical 
questions concerning, for example, birth, death, destiny, could be asked. Because of this aspect, 
Meletinsky argues that myth is “in fact profoundly social by nature, even sociocentric, because its 
scale of value is determined by the interests of the social group, whether this be by lineage tribe, 
city, or state. The fantastic imagery of mythology fully reflects the characteristics of the 
surrounding world because every important natural and social phenomenon must be rooted in 
myth” (157). Mythology is, then, an important site through which the social order of a particular 
culture can be explained, something that would make mythology mimetic. As a particular culture 
gains these insights into its own normative workings and procedures through mythology, it in 
turn reinforces these processes. One such way, Meletinsky explains, is “by enacting myth in 
rituals that are continually repeated” (156). This continual repetition of enactment begs the 
question how myth and the world that needs it are related to one another. Meletinksy traces the 
manner in which mythological meaning was produced in how it was studied: Aristotle, 
particularly in his Poetics, interpreted myth as fable, whereas the later Greeks, such as the Stoics 
and Epicureans, started to interpret myth as allegory, albeit it with consequences for the ‘real’ 
world. For example, Meletinsky explains how the Epicureans believed that myth as allegory for 
natural ‘facts’ was read this way so that priestly and ruling classes could use mythology for their 
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own ends (3). This shows us the strong tie mythology has within the community or society it 
operates: mythology has always carried within it ideological codes which, when interpreted and 
put in practice, subsequently can have practical and political implications. By the time of the 
Renaissance, the domination of allegorical interpretation continued, although there was an 
increasing emphasis on its moral messages. During the Enlightenment myth was deemed the 
product of ignorance and delusion (logically so, given the dominating ideologies of that period), 
and cast in a negative light. It wouldn’t be until the Romantic period that myth would regain 
appreciation once again, though there was a shift from allegorical readings towards appreciating it 
for its aesthetic qualities and symbolic potential.  
The influential modernist work The Golden Bough (1890) by anthropologist James George 
Frazer saw a return to a renewed focus on the ritualistic functions of myth, as well as perspectives 
on the idea of the scapegoat, a concept French philosopher René Girard would come to explore 
extensively in his work (in fact the latter’s approach to this concept is used in this study). In 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, first published in 1944, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno would 
criticize the Enlightenment’s active rejection of mythology as one of the principal contributions 
to the rise of fascism and totalitarianism, since it never succeeded in this rejection: “Just as myths 
already entail enlightenment, with every step enlightenment entangles itself more deeply in 
mythology. Receiving all its subject matter from myths, in order to destroy them, it falls as judge 
under the spell of myth. It seeks to escape the trial of fate and retribution by itself exacting 
retribution on that trial. In myths, everything that happens must atone for the fact of having 
happened.” (2002: 8). Through the denial of the power of mythology, elements of mythology 
could therefore be appropriated in service of the rise of national-socialism in Germany. 
Horkheimer and Adorno do not only tell us something concerning what they deem 
Enlightment’s failed project however, but also something concerning the nature of mythology 
itself. Mythology needs to be rooted within a history in order to be mythical. The historicity of 
mythology was of great interest to the French literary theorist and semiotician Roland Barthes, 
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who studied contemporary myths in his Mythologies, first published in 1957. Barthes’ main concern 
in this study was to expose how reigning discourses and representations concerning a particular 
topic influence our experience of that topic. One such example used by Barthes is an 
investigation into the role that red wine plays in France. Perceived as a way of smoothing social 
situations and the preferred drink of the proletariat, as well having a history of its own through its 
link to the Eucharist (wine serving as an icon for Christ’s blood), Barthes exposes how, 
comparatively, little attention is paid to the effects wine has on the people’s health. The last 
section of Mythologies is dedicated to developing a semiotic approach in uncovering what semiotic 
systems mythology is founded upon, through what Barthes would deem a ‘metalanguage’. 
But mythological time or its origins cannot be empirically traced and pointed out. As 
Meletinsky states: “In mytho-logic, everything that occurs ‘before’ is the first cause, the reason 
for everything that comes ‘after’ … The mythical past, however, is not only a remote epoch, but 
is the time of primordial creation, the proto-time (Ur-zeit), the time of origin - are all valid 
descriptions - that existed before empirical time. In fact, myth marks the sacred time of origin 
and not the empirical time as special” (159). The reason why mythology marks this ‘sacred’ time 
as special is because it needs to in order to attain and keep its mythological status. My study 
focuses on another mythological dynamic: As I will argue, mythology requires to work with 
incomplete images or fragments of an object, because it is precisely the gaps in the object which 
refuse and deny us a holistic appreciation of the myth. This is why myths, even when 
documented, retain their unstable historicity through their own mythological status. A written 
documentation of a myth might have its origins in bygone oral accounts, or other stories, texts or 
rituals that are now lost to us.  
It is this insight that directed my curiosity towards postmodernism. Since postmodern 
texts are known (to the point of notoriety) to investigate their own ontological status as text, I 
was particularly interested in a postmodern text that would in some way address mythology. 
Anne Carson’s novel-in-verse Autobiography of Red (1998) (from here on abbreviated as AOR) is 
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such a text. Carson’s text is popularly referred to as a ‘reworking’ or ‘retelling’ of another text, the 
poem Geryoneis (‘song of Geryon’) by the ancient Greek poet Stesichoros (c. 640 – 555 BC), widely 
assumed to be one of, if not the first, lyric poets in the West. Stesichoros’ poem survives today 
only in the form of papyri fragments, and as such a complete version of the text does not exist 
anymore, although classicist scholars such as Paul Curtis have attempted to render the fragments 
in their original order. In brief, Stesichoros’ poem recounts how the Greek hero Herakles fulfills 
his tenth labour as commanded to him by king Eurystheus. Herakles had to execute these labours 
in order to purify himself after being driven to madness by Hera and slaying his children (and, in 
some accounts, his wife Megara as well). The tenth labour given to him was to set sail for Erythia 
(known as ‘the red island’) in order to slay the giant Geryon. After killing Geryon’s watchdog, 
Orthus, with a blow from his club, Herakles pierced Geryon’s head with an arrow: “the arrow 
went straight into the crown of his head, and his armour and his gory limbs were stained with 
blood; and Geryon tilted his neck like a poppy when spoiling its gentle body suddenly drops its 
petals…” (2011: 84).  
 Carson’s interest in this story is not difficult to explain. While Herakles’ motivation to 
obtain the cattle is clear, Geryon, although a monster, seems to be almost victimized: brutally 
slaughtered by Herakles without any instigation on his own account. In Carson’s text, Geryon has 
become a homosexual teenage boy (but still a monster as well), living in an unspecified part of 
North America. Herakles has become a drifter who seduces the young and impressionable 
Geryon, only to break his heart at the peak of infatuation and desert him. Geryon sets out to 
create a photographic autobiography in order to better understand himself and the workings of 
the world around him.  
While this summary appears to be relatively simple to comprehend, the situation is more 
difficult than first impressions may let on. Apart from the AOR narrative, Carson also includes 
her own ‘fragments of Stesichoros’, or what, at first glance, appear to be translations of the 
Geryoneis. Carson, an acclaimed classicist and translator of ancient Greek works (including the 
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poetry of Sappho), instead offers us a twisted interpretation, where Orthus is presented to us as a 
‘little red dog’. Given Carson’s work in translation, it would be easy for the reader to confuse 
Carson’s work here as a translation of a work that in itself could be parodic, whereas of course 
this is her own parodic interpretation. Even more complicated is the fact that Stesichoros was 
supposedly blinded by Helen of Troy, a mythological figure, for detailing her sexual misconduct 
in his poetry. Stesichoros supposedly rectified the situation by writing “No it is not the true story. 
No you never went on the benched ships. No you never came to the towers of Troy” (1998: 17), 
which caused Helen to restore his sight. Of course, while it is impossible for a mythological 
figure to have blinded a ‘factual’ historical figure, this account so greatly interested Carson that 
she attempts to investigate it, And I shall look closer at her method of investigation in chapter 2. 
But this is also the moment where we see why this work becomes important in a postmodern 
context. Stesichoros’ blinding is only presented to us in his own work and that of other poets, 
and no factual or historical documentation concerning his going blind (what caused it, or whether 
he did at all) survives. As such, to return to Meletinsky, we have a prime example of “primordial” 
time: an historical event that is so far removed from our current epoch and its documentation so 
sparse that it has itself reached mythological status.  
 Another postmodern issue presented here is that we have signs (Herakles and Geryon) 
that have travelled between two different texts. As such, these signs take with them the history of 
the text where they were first represented in, while at the same time now being placed in a new 
story. Since the Geryoneis is already fragmentary, it becomes problematic to determine what the 
different signs within the text are supposed to signify, as the history they refer to is an incomplete 
one. What could perhaps be determined to be exemplary of postmodern texts, there is 
consequently instilled within the reader a hermeneutic tendency (that could topple over into 
paranoia) to continuously wonder whether he or she understood ‘the meaning’ of the text, but 
given the fact that the referent is itself a collection of remaining fragments, this is made 
impossible. Instead, by taking a semiotic approach, I explore the way these sign systems are 
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constructed (in so far as they are still ‘constructed’), how they signify and what this signifying 
itself means. Through an understanding of these systems and how they signify, we may gain more 
understanding of the way mythology functions, and what ideological consequences this has.  
In the first chapter, I shall follow Girard’s readings of myths as texts of persecution. For 
Girard, mythology is mimetic in that myths represent crises or critical situations in a given period 
of time for a given community or society, and through reading myth in this way, we can uncover 
ideological discourses. Accordingly, I will approach AOR as such a text in order to uncover its 
underlying ideological codes. In chapter 2, I will first deal with Carson’s dialectic investigation 
into the blinding of Stesichoros. Employing Linda Hutcheon’s theory concerning historiographic 
metafiction, parody, and postmodernism, I shall elaborate how this parody works and further 
problematizes the ontological status of the text. Following that, I shall use Barthes’ theory 
concerning myth and metalanguage in order to show how, diachronically, the signs and concepts 
within AOR refer back to the signs and concepts used in the Geryoneis, and how the fact that the 
Geryoneis is itself an incomplete text causes AOR to produce more mythology. In the third and 
final chapter, after having studied the voyaging of these signs and concepts in a 
temporal/diachronic dimension, I shall attempt to conceive how these signs and concepts have 
travelled in a spatial sense, using Barthes’ concepts of the notion of the ‘work’ and the ‘Text’. 
Through this distinction, I shall then attempt to conceptualize ‘textual space’, using Barthes 
definition of Text to examine how this is related to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy 
concerning smooth and striated space. Finally, after having conceptualized such a notion of space 
and having distinguished what, in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s terms, regime of signs is operational 
within the text, I shall propose that, while it is possible to escape a regime of mythology, it is 
impossible to escape mythology itself, which will allow me to argue that mythology has a 
diagrammatic function: capable of what Deleuze and Guattari deem an ‘absolute 
deterritorialization’. 
 
12 
 
Chapter 1 - Reading Autobiography of Red as a text of persecution 
 
I 
In his readings of myths, René Girard distinguishes several ‘stereotypes’ (that is, stereotypical 
qualities present in a text) for what he referred to as ‘texts of persecution’. He describes these 
stereotypes as “a generalized loss of differences” (the first stereotype), crimes that “eliminate 
differences” (the second stereotype), and whether the identified authors of these crimes possess 
the marks that suggest a victim, the paradoxical marks of the absence of difference (the third 
stereotype). The fourth stereotype is “violence itself” (1986: 24). Girard maintains that not all of 
these qualities need to be present in the text for it to be dubbed a text of persecution; three or 
even two of the four stereotypes would suffice.   
In looking at which of these stereotypes Autobiography of Red (AOR) possesses, I want to 
start out with discussing the third stereotype as it relates directly to the protagonist of AOR, 
Geryon. In his reading of the Oedipus myth, Girard states that a mythological character 
“manages to combine the marginality of the outsider with the marginality of the insider” (1986: 
25). Geryon, described as simultaneously a boy and a red-winged monster, possesses these 
paradoxical marks. In Girard’s theory, any character which bears the combination of such 
paradoxical marks in a mythological text is bound to attract disaster. AOR falls in line with 
Girard’s theory: the “crimes” that are committed in the story are all related to intimacy and 
sexuality. When Geryon and his (unnamed) brother need to start sharing a room and a bunk bed, 
Geryon’s brother is masturbating: 
 
His brother was pulling on his stick as he did most nights before sleep. 
Why do you pull on your stick? 
Geryon asked. None of your business let’s see yours, said his brother. 
No. 
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Bet you don’t have one. Geryon checked. Yes I do. 
You’re so ugly I bet it fell off. 
Geryon remained silent. He knew the difference between facts and brother 
hatred. 
Show me yours 
and I’ll give you something good, said Geryons brother. 
No. 
Give you one of my cat’s-eyes.  
No you won’t. 
I will. 
Don’t believe you. 
Promise. 
Now Geryon very much wanted a cat’s-eye. He never could win a cat’s eye when 
he 
knelt on cold knees 
on the basement floor to shoot marbles with his brother and his brother’s friends. 
A cat’s-eye 
is outranked only by a steelie. And so they developed an economy of sex for cat’s-
eyes. 
Pulling the stick makes my brother happy, thought Geryon. Don’t tell Mom, 
said his brother. 
Voyaging into the rotten ruby of the night became a contest of freedom and bad 
logic. 
Come on Geryon. 
No. 
You owe me. 
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No. 
I hate you. I don’t care. I’ll tell Mom. Tell Mom what? 
How nobody likes you at school. 
Geryon paused. Facts are bigger in the dark. Sometimes then he would descend 
to the other bunk 
and let his brother do what he liked or else hang in between with his face pressed 
into the edge of his own mattress, 
cold toes balancing on the bed below. After it was over his brother’s voice 
got very kind. (27-28) 
 
Incest is a form of (sexual) violence which Girard perceives as exemplary for a text of 
persecution. Geryon’s brother repeatedly tries to persuade Geryon into sexual activity, either 
through insult, threat or reward. If we look at the dialogue between Geryon and his brother, 
there is a telling quality in the negotiations that take place. The textual friction here is caused by 
the form as much as the content: Geryon refers to the penis as a stick, and the trading of sexual 
favors for a cat’s-eye gives the violence the form of a childish game or prank. Girard writes about 
this:  “In certain, especially Greek, mythologies these crimes are often not treated as crimes; they 
are seen as mere pranks; they are excused and made light of but they are nevertheless present 
and, at least in letter if not in spirit, they correspond perfectly to our stereotype” (1986: 31). The 
prank or game form of the discussion between the two brothers highlights another aspect. 
Though the age gap is never precisely mentioned, Geryon’s brother is the older of the two. Thus, 
the crime committed here may not just be incestuous in nature, but pedophilic as well. For 
Girard, the incentive for Geryon’s brother to manipulate Geryon into these sexual practices is his 
duality of form and of being. This is because the duality of boy and monster are formal 
characteristics, but it is the boundary between form and being which is transgressed. This 
15 
 
happens as formal deformity is linked to moral deformity, which Richard Golsan describes as 
follows: 
 
There is an important distinction to be drawn between the physical and the moral defects 
of mythical monsters, a distinction which the myths themselves often obscure. According 
to Girard, the physical defects or deformities correspond to real human characteristics: 
they have their origins in reality, in the original acts of persecution from which the myths 
themselves arise. The moral defects, however, are fictions attributed to the victim by the 
persecutors to justify the persecution and ultimately exonerate themselves. (64) 
 
Golsan’s comments are relevant because Geryon does not appear to necessarily possess any 
moral defects. Instead, having a physical ‘defect’ is equated to a moral ‘defect’; that of being 
different and consequently excluded from the norm. In Girard’s theory, myths are ultimately 
documents which in one way or another always refer to a historical real. In that context, the 
moral defects may be grounded on history as much as the physical ones; Girard does not take 
into account that physical defects can be tied/seen as a moral one (rather than being two separate 
qualities). Girard does, however, recognize the different elements which make up monstrosity: 
 
In the mythological monster the "physical" and the "moral" are inseparable. The two are 
so perfectly combined that any attempt to separate them seems doomed to failure. Yet, if 
l am right, there is a distinction to be made. Physical deformity must correspond to a real 
human characteristic, a real infirmity. Oedipus's wounds or Vulcan's limp are not 
necessarily less real in their origins than the characteristics of medieval witches. Moral 
monstrosity, by contrast, actualizes the tendency of all persecutors to project the 
monstrous results of some calamity or public or private misfortune onto some poor 
unfortunate who, by being infirm or a foreigner, suggests a certain affinity to the 
monstrous. My analysis may seem strange, for the monstrous character is generally 
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perceived as being the final proof of the absolutely fictitious and imaginary character of 
mythology. Yet in the monster we recognize the false certainty and the true possibility 
that I have been discussing. (1986: 34) 
 
Though Girard’s theory befits Geryon in the sense that the physical and the moral are 
inseparable, it is different in that the physical deformity is used by Geryon’s brother as the moral 
deformity, as Geryon’s ‘ugliness’ is the reason why nobody likes him. This does, in a roundabout 
way, further supports Girard’s argument regarding the relationship between the mythological and 
the historical, as there isn’t any specific calamity projected onto the victim in our case. It is the 
monstrous deformity itself which is the incentive for violence.  
The underlying assumption in Girardian theory is that the correlation between a moral 
and physical deformity is in fact a causal relationship. In AOR, we can see a sign of this relation 
manifested through the manipulation of Geryon’s brother (‘Bet you don’t have one. / Geryon 
checked. Yes I do. / You’re so ugly I bet it fell off.’). To Girard, the fact that this duality takes place (an 
older brother manipulating his younger brother into performing sexual acts) is what makes it 
refer to a (non-specific) historical reality - that of incestuous violence. 
 As Geryon grows into adolescence he meets a young drifter named Herakles. They fall in 
love with each other, and, while never explicitly mentioned, this signifies Geryon as being 
homosexual. Though this is never explicitly problematized in the book, the correlation between 
the moral and physical deformity now starts to take shape.  In regards to this shifting of elements 
(boy, monster, sexuality), Girard says the following: 
 
Monsters are surely the result of a fragmentation of perception and of a decomposition 
followed by a recombination that does not take natural specificity into account. A 
monster is an unstable hallucination that, in retrospect, crystallizes into stable forms, 
owing to the fact that it is remembered in a world that has regained stability. (1986: 33) 
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In reading this passage it is important to acknowledge that this “fragmentation of perception” 
can be read in different ways. On the one hand it could be read as a recombination (ergo, also a 
representation) of different historical realities into a myth, and, since it does not have to take 
“natural specificity” into account, can consequently give way to the monstrous form. On the 
other hand it may refer to a fragmentation of perception within the myth itself, or finally a 
combination of both. The final sentence emphasizes Girard’s point that, when ‘the world’ has 
regained its stability, it can reflect on the monster. But this final remark, too, is problematic, as 
the ‘world’ to which Girard refers can be read in different ways as well: the world in which the 
myth takes place (a fictional world), or the historical reality to which the myth refers to (which is, 
ultimately, the “real” world). The mythical world provides us with an “unstable hallucination” of 
the monster because it is a textual world, which is a finite (and in this sense, stable) world (since it 
is a text which has a beginning and an ending), yet is also holistic in nature (as a semantic field). 
The “real” word, on the other hand, is not finite, and neither is its terminology. This is where the 
semiotic dynamic between these two worlds comes into play. Let us consider the following 
passage: 
 
Herakles lies like a piece of torn silk in the heat of the blue saying, 
Geryon please. The break in his voice 
made Geryon think for some reason of going into a barn 
first thing in the morning 
when sunlight strikes a bale of raw hay still wet from the night. 
Put your mouth on it Geryon please. 
Geryon did. It tasted sweet enough. I am learning a lot this year in my life, 
thought Geryon. It tasted very young. (54) 
 
It is suggestive to read the “it” here as either the penis or some other body part of Herakles 
(rather than a part of Geryon’s own body or something different altogether). But the fact that 
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“it” is an it (rather than the penis or other specified body part) is exactly what makes it an 
“unstable” sign and leads to the fragmentation of perception. Its signifier (“it”) belongs to one 
world (the mythological), but it is the signified (the implied sexual act) which refers to the 
historically real, i.e., homosexuality. This signified is in turn linked to another signifier, that of the 
monstrous form that Geryon embodies. Thus, we get a recombined sign (the homosexual 
monster) whose signifier and signified are composed in two other signs (the homosexual act and 
the monster). 
The fact that we are inclined to read the “it” as indicative of a sexual act is what makes us 
rhetorically aware. As I posited earlier, the main issue in Girard’s theory is that correlation does 
not automatically imply causation, but that this assumption does have rhetoric consequences, 
which is precisely the issue AOR plays with. It would not be without merit to argue that Girard’s 
consistent use of the term ‘deformity’ subliminally reinforces the ideology it intends to expose; 
we could also use the term ‘characteristic’ to address the same quality we want to point out. Yet 
Girard’s use of the term is not without motivation. Myths are par excellence what Barthes dubs 
textes scriptible: the type of text which overflows with codes (hermeneutic, historical, semiotic) and 
as such challenges the reader in his or her position as subject. In this challenge we cannot but 
take position to what happens in the mythological text; which is to make its implicit suggestions ( 
that these qualities are treated as deformities) explicit, yet by making them explicit we inevitably 
contribute to the ideology by defining its own terminology in this way. The result of this move on 
the reader’s part, in having to position himself as subject in relation to the text, is an issue of 
problematizing the relation between connotation and denotation. For what does the sign “it” 
denotate? It is solely a referent to another sign within the limits of the semantic field of the text 
that the reader operates, yet simultaneously within the endless context of the connotations of the 
codes known to him outside this text, which coerces the reader to “write into” the text. The 
reader’s agency as a result cannot anymore be depoliticized, and he cannot remain positionless. 
Yet through making the reader aware of his position, or rather, that he has to take position at all, 
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reveals to him the plurality of positions we can take, the plurality of reading the “it”, as I’ve given 
several examples above, each having their own consequences in relation to myth. In the next 
chapters, I will build further on this concept through the Barthesian idea of a metalanguage. 
 
II 
The examples I gave in the first part showed different manifestations of violence following 
Girard’s theory, exposing Geryon’s role as scapegoat. For Girard, the scapegoat does not become 
one by accident, but as a result of what Girard calls mimetic or triangular desire. Girard’s concept 
assumes that there is a subject (who will ultimately become the scapegoat) who desires an object. 
The subject is opposed by a model-rival, who desires the same object. This explains the triangular 
form of the concept. The desire is mimetic because the subject is only reinforced in his desire for 
the object because the rival desires it as well. To Girard we are as such ‘interviduals’; we are the 
model for the other through which we are (via mediation) constituted in the world, but at the 
same time we constitute others in our own role as model-rival to them. This creates a kind of 
feedback loop, where the one subject becomes the model-rival for his rival and vice versa, 
creating mimetic rivalry, and this in turn gives way to violence: “Violence is not originary; it is a 
by-product of mimetic rivalry. Violence is mimetic rivalry itself becoming violent as the 
antagonists who desire the same object keep thwarting each other and desiring the same object all 
the more. Violence is supremely mimetic” (1996: 12-13).  
 While I do not contest the statements made above, Girard’s concept is based on the 
following presupposition: “If the appropriative gesture of an individual named A is rooted in the 
imitation of an individual named B, it means that A and B must reach together for one and the 
same object” (1996: 9).  But how can we be certain both individuals reach for the same object? 
What if the mimetic element is in the behavior itself rather than the object reached? Let us again 
look at the example I gave on pages 12-14. We can deduce several desired objects: the cat’s eye, 
sex, intimacy, happiness, and the keeping of certain secrets. But not all of these objects are 
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desired by both brothers. Geryon partially submits to his brother’s coercion because it makes his 
brother happy. In turn, Geryon’s brother seems to have Geryon’s happiness, at least to some 
extent (paired perhaps with his own guilt) as object: 
 
After it was over his brother’s voice 
got very kind. 
You’re nice Geryon I’ll take you swimming tomorrow okay? (28) 
 
These objects, however, have a substitutional function. For Girard, we strive to capture our 
rival’s being, lead by the illusion that the other’s being would enhance our own: “Our deepest 
desire is not for things or objects, but to be” (1996: 290). This reaches its apotheosis when the 
subject cannot distinguish himself from his model-rival: “The experience of the double occurs 
when the model-obstacle as overpowering other is so internalized that the subject does not 
experience of self and the model-mediator. The subject is thus ‘possessed’ by the other” (1996: 
290). It is through substituting objects that the feedback loop mentioned by Girard is put into 
practice. This substituting is complicated further. Geryon’s desire to please his brother (through 
sexual intimacy) serves what is seemingly Geryon’s own desire: that of being liked and accepted. 
Geryon’s later relationship with Herakles in many ways mirrors his relationship with his brother, 
because the desire is transferred to a different model. As is shown in the example earlier, Geryon 
here too is coerced into sex. All the while, Geryon’s other main aim seems to be to create his 
autobiography (first through writing, later on through photography). This shows us how the 
model is triangular in another way, through something akin to a mise-en-abyme. The desires of 
Geryon’s brother and Herakles in their being described are part of a larger triangular figure, where the 
angles are occupied by Geryon, his rival, and ultimately his autobiography. My reading here 
suggests that Geryon desires are part of the other triangular figure (Geryon as model-rival-object 
of the rival’s desire) in order to fit this into his own triangular figure, straying away from a more 
21 
 
traditional mythological form of the triangular figure: Geryon needs the desire of his rivals in 
order to ultimately fulfil his own desires (of being able to create an autobiography).  
This plateauing structure of the triangular figures exposes a complexity that stands in 
contrast with Girard’s analysis, as when he states:  
 
The subject would like to think of himself as the victim of an atrocious injustice but in his 
anguish he wonders whether perhaps he does not deserve his apparent condemnation. 
Rivalry therefore only aggravates mediation; it increases the mediator’s prestige and 
strengthens the bond which links the object to this mediator by forcing him to affirm 
openly his right or desire of possession. (1996: 42) 
 
As I’ve stated at the beginning of this second part, the role of subject and rival is a matter of 
perspective. While we can transpose Girard’s first statement directly towards Geryon’s position 
as subject, it is the latter half of the statement which is problematized. Geryon’s objects of desire, 
acceptance and his authoring his autobiography, deal not so much with a possession of this 
object but a desire to be possessed: 
 
Hello? Geryon? Hi it’s me. You sound funny were you asleep? 
Herakles’ voice went bouncing through Geryon on hot gold springs. 
Oh. No. No I wasn’t. 
So how are things? What are you up to? Oh - Geryon sat down hard on the rug. 
fire was closing off his lungs - 
not much. You? Oh the usual you know this and that and did some good painting 
last night with Hart. Heart? 
I guess you didn’t meet Hart when you were here he came over from 
the mainland last Saturday 
or was it Friday no Saturday Hart is a boxer says he might train me to be  
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his corner man. Really. 
A good corner man can make the difference Hart says. 
Does he. 
Muhammad Ali had a corner man named Mr. Kopps they used to hunch down 
there on the rope and write poems 
together in between rounds. Poems. But that’s not why I called Geryon 
the reason I called is to tell you 
about my dream I had a dream of you last night. Did you. Yes you were this 
old Indian guy standing on the back porch 
and there was a pail of water there on the step with a drowned bird in it - 
big yellow bird really huge you know 
floating with its wings out and you leaned over and said, Come on now 
get out of here - and you took it 
by one wing and just flung it right up into the air WHOOSH it came alive 
and then it was gone. 
Yellow? said Geryon and he was thinking Yellow! Yellow! Even in my dreams he doesn’t 
know me at all! Yellow! 
What’d you say Geryon? 
Nothing. 
It’s a freedom dream Geryon. 
Yes. 
Freedom is what I want for you Geryon we’re true friends you know that’s why 
I want you to be free. 
Don’t want to be free want to be with you. Beaten but alert Geryon organized all his 
inside force to suppress this remark. (73-74) 
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Herakles’ mentioning of another man and his metaphorical dream are seemingly used here to 
distance himself from Geryon, but rather it is a rhetorical device used to achieve the exact 
opposite: through distancing himself from Geryon, Geryon desires to be with Herakles even 
more. But Herakles’ rhetoric ultimately suggests he too desires to be possessed: the dream is 
merely a method used in order for him to remain desired. This relationship demonstrates the 
mimetic effect that takes place. Girard writes on this: 
 
Once his basic needs are satisfied (indeed, sometimes even before), man is subject to 
intense desires, though he may not know precisely for what. The reason is that he desires 
being, something he himself lacks and which some other person seems to possess. The 
subject thus looks to that other person to inform him of what he should desire in order 
to acquire that being. If the model, who is apparently already endowed with superior 
being, desires some object, that object must surely be capable of conferring an even 
greater plenitude of being. (1979: 146) 
 
In this analysis we can see that the model’s being can be the object itself in the sense that he offers 
the possibility of offering an “even greater plenitude of being”. This supports my hypothesis of 
the plateauing of the triangular figures: Herakles’ and Geryon’s desire of each other is only an 
object of desire which can facilitate another, unnamed object. Though it might seem 
contradictory that Herakles seeks to distance himself from Geryon, this fits into what Girard calls 
the ‘double bind’: “If desire is allowed to follow its own bent, its mimetic nature will almost 
always lead it into a double bind. The unchanneled mimetic impulse hurls itself blindly against the 
obstacle of a conflicting desire. It invites its own rebuffs, and these rebuffs will in turn strengthen 
the mimetic inclination” (1979: 148). The double bind offers an explanation for Herakles’ 
distancing himself from Geryon. Though thinly veiled in wanting Geryon to be free, it is rather 
his own desire to be free which conflicts with his own desire to be desired. These two desires are 
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reconciled through recounting his dream to Geryon. Veiled in good intentions, Herakles finds a 
way to create his desired distance while leaving Geryon wanting to be with Herakles all the more. 
Geryon’s doubt and longing tie into Girard’s statement of the subject wondering whether 
he deserves his apparent condemnation, though I do not wish to suggest here that the 
scapegoating Geryon is subjected to, is in its essence thinly veiled self-induced victimization. 
Geryon’s desires however, are not without traces of narcissism, as shown in the pages following 
Herakles leaving Geryon: 
 
Years passed 
as his eyes ran water and a thousand ideas jumped his brain - If the world 
ends now I am free and 
If the world ends now no one will see my autobiography - finally it bumped. (70) 
 
We can tie this to Girard’s notion of (Stendhal’s) vaniteux: 
 
The Romantic vaniteux always wants to convince himself that his desire is written into the 
nature of things, or which amounts to the same thing, that is the emanation of a serene 
subjectivity, the creation ex nihilo of a quasi-divine ego. Desire is no longer rooted in the 
object perhaps, but is rooted in the subject; it is certainly not rooted in the Other. The 
objective and subjective fallacies are one and the same; both originate in the image which 
we all have of our own desires. (1996: 43) 
 
Girard’s statement is insightful when tied to Geryon’s desire to create an autobiography. If the 
vaniteux (Geryon) convinces himself that his desire is written into the nature of things (for 
example, Herakles), he seeks in turn to capture the experience of this thing in his autobiography. 
This again supports my theory of the plateauing of the triangular figures, related to what Girard 
names the image of our desire: Geryon’s desire to be possessed instead of being free in turn 
serves his desire to create his autobiography. However, Girard’s use of the term image here 
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seems to me erroneous in that it might invoke the suggestion that the image is immanent (rooted 
in the subject) and the actual desire transcendental. I would argue instead that both desires (i.e. 
both the desire itself and its image) are immanent but that it is the relationship between them which 
is transcendental. The text illustrates Geryon’s awareness of both of his desires, but what is out 
of reach for him is knowing how these different desires relate to one another. 
 
III 
 
So far I have discussed both Girard’s theory on violence and on mimetic desire, but how are they 
related to one another? In Geryon’s relationships with Herakles and with his brother we have 
seen mimetic desire in practice. Geryon’s desire to be possessed by Herakles is contrasted by 
Herakles’ desire to be free (and for Geryon to be free) is in turn contrasted with his mimicking 
Geryon’s desire to be desired. This results in two different desires converging on the same object, 
which creates conflict, which in turn leads to violence. Mimetic desire fuels an endless loop in the 
subject to both be imitated and at the same time offering resistance to being imitated, for too 
much imitation threatens the appropriation of the object by the model of the subject. This 
resistance by the subject only instigates violence further: “Violent opposition, then, is the signifier 
of ultimate desire, of divine self-sufficiency, of that ‘beautiful totality’ whose beauty depends on 
its being inaccessible and impenetrable” (1979: 148). This idea of a ‘beautiful totality’ further 
supports my proposed theory given at the end of the previous part, as both the image of desire 
and desire itself are part of that totality, and given that they are ‘inaccesible and impenetrable’ 
underscores the transcendental nature of the relationship between the image and the desire itself. 
Furthermore, this correlates strongly with the idea that an ‘even greater plenitude of being’ is to 
be found in the model-rival since this is the image of the desire which keeps on propelling the 
loop of mimetic desire.  
Such a loop may suggest that the violence, like mimetic desire itself, is spread out evenly. 
As is demonstrated in AOR, this is not the case. Geryon is the scapegoat due to his dualistic 
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nature of being both monster and boy. Yet, the same can be said about Herakles or Geryon’s 
brother; their monstrosity simply manifests itself in a way other than the physical. Girard’s dubs 
this phenomenon the ‘monstrous double’:  
 
In the collective experience of the monstrous double the differences are not eliminated, but 
muddied and confused. All the doubles are interchangeable, although their basic similarity 
is never formally acknowledged. They thus occupy the equivocal middle ground between 
difference and unity that is indispensable to the process of sacrificial substitution - to the 
polarization of violence onto a single victim who substitutes for all the others. (1979: 161) 
 
The concept of the monstrous double allows for the violence to be focused and directed, then. 
This is why, in AOR, even though the desire is mimetic between the different characters, the 
violence caused by this desire is directed towards Geryon, since he is the one whose monstrous 
qualities are explicitly exposed (textually, in his monstrous form), while those of both Herakles 
and his brother are not. As a result, Geryon becomes the scapegoat, an outcast, who is 
abandoned. To Girard, it is stereotypical of the mythological text to emphasize the monstrous 
qualities of its protagonist, while downplaying the monstrous qualities of its antagonists. In this 
sense AOR falls in line with Girard’s theory of myth; Herakles’ and Geryon’s brother’s actions 
are never condemned as monstrous, whereas for Geryon himself the monstrous is caught in his 
very form, inescapable, designating him as the perfect scapegoat. 
This provokes the question whether the differences here not too clear, for is Geryon’s 
formal monstrosity not of a whole different category than that of his antagonists? Girard writes: 
“The nature of the relationship between monster and double, stubbornly denied by the 
antagonists, is ultimately imposed on them in the course of the shifting of differences - but it is 
imposed in the form of a hallucination” (1979: 160). This begs the question: what kind of 
hallucination is at play in AOR? Geryon’s monstrosity is of the type that Edwards and Graulund 
deem grotesque: “figures that are a combination of the human and non-human” (2013: 36). This 
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combination can then be “interpreted as unnatural and, as such, a potential sign for inner 
corruption” (2013: 36-37). Consequently, Geryon’s (formal) monstrosity is the excuse used for 
making him a scapegoat. The instability of this hallucination is then caused because Geryon’s 
grotesquery is defined through his monstrous form, while the monstrous aspects of his 
antagonists/doubles aren’t. If Geryon’s monstrosity, or his dualistic nature beyond that, belongs 
to the realm of the fantastic, his brother’s and Herakles’ monstrosity refer to the historical real 
(incest and pedophilia) and literary tropes (the romantic drifter and vagabond), respectively.  
 
Girard’s approach in his readings of myth should be understood in terms of functioning 
in the service of literary sociology. For Girard, myths themselves are mimetic in in a similar way 
as understood by Meletinsky: mythology is a way in which a people, through creating a collection 
fictional stories can both express and understand the world around them. Girard does not deviate 
much, as in his readings the myths were a product of their specific time and as such can give us 
insight into the way a society or community operated in a specific period. This lead Girard to 
developing an approach towards myths in such a way that an analysis of mythology was to be 
used to uncover factual historical realities and ideological discourse that were embedded in the 
mythological fictions. In this analysis, however, Girard does not take into account how – if we 
use mythology as a means to represent, explain and understand our own world – mythology may 
do more than inform that world alone. Our understanding and interpretation of mythology 
consequently alters the way we perceive and act in that world, which in turn alters the way we 
perceive and approach mythology (since it is part of that world). Mythology, then, may have 
more than a mimetic function alone. The function of my close reading of AOR in this chapter is 
not to explain or theorize a sociological function of this particular text, but rather Girard’s 
approach allows me to analyze why Geryon fits the criteria of being designated as a scapegoat. 
This analysis is of value because, as we shall see in chapter 3, Deleuze and Guattari deem the 
scapegoat the figure par excellence which is able to traverse between regimes of signs. 
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In the following chapter we shall explore the way Carson investigates (while parodying 
the very investigation) the mythological past out of which AOR was born. This will complicate 
the relationship between history and mythology further, which will be explored through the 
theory of metalanguage by Barthes. 
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Chapter 2 - Historiographic metafiction and metalingual mythology 
 
I 
 
In the first chapter we have seen that in the theory of René Girard mythology always refers to a 
‘historical real’. He summarized this idea in an almost Barthesian statement: “There is no term in 
any language that is not accompanied by mythological inflections” (1977: 154). This creates a 
complex relationship between the language of the historical real and that of mythology, as 
Girard’s statement inflects that the language of the first is drenched in the connotations of the 
language of the second. If we are to investigate how and in what manner the past existed, we 
have to consequently scrutinize the (mythological) language that represents that past, tying 
Girard’s statement to Linda Hutcheon's concept of historiographic metafiction: 
 
The past really did exist. The question is how can we know that past today and what can we 
know of it? The overt metafictionality of novels like Shame or Star Turn acknowledges 
their own constructing, ordering, and selecting processes, but these are always shown to 
be historically determined acts. It puts into question, at the same time as it exploits, the 
grounding of historical knowledge in the past real. This is why I have been calling this 
historiographic metafiction. (1988: 92) 
 
The historical realities that were referenced to in the first chapter were those realities (incest, 
pedophilia) hidden by a mythological form and unveiled through Girard's theory.  
There are, however, aspects to the texts accompanying the AOR narrative which are 
quintessentially historical in nature and have not yet been discussed. The work starts not with the 
narrative of AOR but with two texts entitled Red meat: what difference did Stesichoros make? and Red 
meat: fragments of Stesichoros. The first of these texts presents itself as a critical reflection on 
Stesichoros: 
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When Gertrude Stein had to sum up Picasso she said, "This one was working." So say of 
Stesichorus, "This one was making adjectives." What is an adjective? Nouns name the 
world. Verbs activate names. Adjectives come from somewhere else … To Helen of Troy 
for example, was attached an adjectival tradition of whoredom already old by the time 
Homer used it. When Stesichoros unlatched her epithet from Helen there flowed out 
such a light as may have blinded him for a moment. This is a big question, the question 
of the blinding of Stesichoros by Helen (see Appendixes A, B), although generally 
regarded as unanswerable. (4-5) 
 
In the appendices Carson refers to dialectic is used as a method to discover in what way Helen 
could have blinded Stesichoros: “1. Either Stesichoros was a blind man or he was not. 2. If 
Stesichoros was a blind man either his blindness was a temporary condition or it was permanent” 
(18). The principal question here should be how a mythological figure was able to blind a 
historical figure. But this question is ignored, and instead Carson has opted to put into question 
the way whether this event could have happened (challenging its historical ground, but not its 
impossibility), while simultaneously parodying the very method by which we question the 
accuracy and proof of the historical nature of such an event: critical inquiry and (in appendix C) 
dialectic. It is this aspect to the text which makes it both parody and historiographical 
metafiction, since it uses an academic method (dialectic) to answer a question which cannot be 
definitively answered. Hutcheon defines parody as “a form of repetition with ironic critical 
distance, marking difference rather than similarity” (1985: xii). Taking Hutcheon’s definition, we 
must examine closely what is being repeated here, as ‘form of repetition’ is something different 
from a ‘repetition of form’. Later on, however, Hutcheon narrows down her definition: “Of 
course, parody is clearly a formal phenomenon - a bitextual synthesis or a dialogic relation 
between texts - but without the consciousness (and then interpretation) of that discursive 
doubling by the perceiver, how could parody actually be said to exist, much less ‘work’ (1985: 
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xiii)?”  Hutcheon’s statement here seems lacking in specificity. If parody is, indeed, a formal 
phenomenon, then her commentary is applicable to any other form of trope or topos - a reader 
will always need some kind of background knowledge in order to recognize a trope. If the 
element of repetition of form is specifically a hallmark of parody, then this is a defining element in 
the bitextual synthesis or dialogic relation between texts concerning parody. However, here too 
we need to consider whether parody, particularly postmodern parody, is in fact bitextual in nature. 
Let us turn to Hutcheon’s own definition concerning what she calls postmodernist: 
 
This is the confrontation that I shall be calling postmodernist: where documentary 
historical actuality meets formalist self-reflexivity and parody. At this conjuncture, a study 
of representation becomes, not a study of mimetic mirroring or subjective projecting, but 
an exploration of the way in which narratives and images structure how we see ourselves 
and how we construct our notions of self, in the present and in the past. (2002: 7) 
 
Here Hutcheon offers us another way out of the necessity of the bitextual relationship in parody, 
in the plurality of “narratives and images”. Hutcheon’s definition of parody implicitly relies on 
the idea of an original (since a repetition of form implies that there is an original to repeat) - an 
idea which is problematized both by postmodernism and mythology. The problematization 
manifests itself in different ways, but what these have in common is their focus on the historicity 
of the original. In the second and third sections of this chapter, I will delve deeper into the issue 
between historicity and mythology, but for now I’ll focus on the issue of the historicity in relation 
to the idea of the original in postmodern theory, since this is also exploited in AOR.  
When we look at Red meat: what difference did Stesichoros make? one of the things that makes 
it differ from other parodies in that it doesn’t parody an original in a ‘traditional’ sense, but is a 
repetition of form in its most literal sense: by parodying the rhetoric form of dialectic, specifically 
Aristotelian syllogistics. Yet, if we are to ask what original we can refer to, to see how it is 
different and parodic, we encounter a serious issue. In a ‘traditional’ parody, the bitextual nature 
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of the relationship reveals to us the differences between the texts after conducting research, 
allowing us to point out and mark the differences between the two texts, and as such the research 
shows what specific rhetorical devices in the second text are parodic in nature. In this sense 
Carson’s text seemingly falls in line with Hutcheon’s paradox of the postmodern: “I would add 
that, in the postmodernist writing of history and literature, it does so [contesting the ‘grounds’ of 
the text] by first installing and then critically confronting both that grounding process and those 
grounds themselves” (1988: 92).  
In appendix C (entitled ‘Clearing up the question of Stesichoros’ blinding by Helen’), 
Carson employs the dialectical method in order to clear up this question. The first five statements 
are as follows: 
 
1. Either Stesichoros was a blind man or he was not. 
2. If Stesichoros was a blind man either his blindness was a temporary condition or it was 
permanent. 
3. If Stesichoros’ blindness was a temporary condition this condition either had a 
contingent cause or it had none. 
4. If this condition had a contingent that cause was Helen or the cause was not Helen. 
5. If the cause was Helen Helen had her reasons or she had none. (18) 
 
As we see in this example, both grounding and confrontation are happening at the same time. 
This is because any enquiry into the historicity of this event presupposes that the event did 
happen, but contests it by investigating how it could have happened. This is also the element of 
the text that problematizes its own ontological status - whether this is a serious critical text, a 
parody on a critical text, or both of those simultaneously. 
Carson’s use of syllogisms (deriving  from  only where  is a logical consequence of ) 
thus far is solid. By using this method however, Carson subverts the question whether Helen could 
have blinded Stesichoros at all. This is where Hutcheon’s postmodern paradox begins, and is 
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sequential in nature; Carson’s ground here is the validity of the syllogistic method as a ground for 
reasoning. It is exploited when she starts to use the method to answer nonsensical questions, and 
through this exploitation parodies the dialectic. The exploitation exposed, Carson dialectic 
unravels into absurdity: 
 
6. If Helen had her reasons the reasons arose out of some remark Stesichoros made or 
they did not. 
7. If Helen’s reasons arose out of some remark Stesichoros made either it was a strong 
remark about Helen’s sexual misconduct (not to say its unsavory aftermath the Fall of 
Troy) or it was not. 
8. If it was a strong remark about Helen’s sexual misconduct (not to say its unsavory 
aftermath the Fall of Troy) either this remark was a lie or it was not. 
9. If it was not a lie we are now in reverse and by continuing to reason in this way are 
likely to arrive back at the beginning of the question of the blinding of Stesichoros or we 
are not. 
10. If we are now in reverse and by continuing to reason in this way are likely to arrive 
back at the beginning of the question of the blinding of Stesichoros either we will go 
along without incident or we will meet Stesichoros on our way back. 
11. If we meet Stesichoros on our way back either we will keep quiet or we will look him 
in the eye and ask him what he thinks of Helen. 
12. If we look Stesichoros in the eye and ask him what he thinks of Helen he will tell the 
truth or he will lie.  
13. If Stesichoros lies either we will know at once that he is lying or we will be fooled 
because now that we are in reverse the whole landscape looks inside out. 
 
Margaret Rose, in her formalist and historical study of parody, Parody: ancient, modern and post-
modern (1993), states that the effects of parody on the reader are “(1) Shock or surprise, and 
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humour, from conflict with expectations about the texts parodied. (2) Change in the views of the 
reader of the parodied text” (38). Rose’s effects can certainly be found in the absurdist effect 
Carson’s analysis has. Parody’s comical effects, however, present it as seemingly innocent, 
limiting it to being entertaining. Hutcheon takes a radically different stance: “Postmodern art 
cannot but be political, at least in the sense that its representations – its images and stories – are 
anything but neutral, however ‘aestheticized’ they may appear to be in their parodic self-
reflexivity” (2002: 3). In Hutcheon’s theory Rose’s formalist/comical effects are limited, as she 
finds that to be the residue of “eighteenth century notions of wit and ridicule” (2002: 90). To 
Hutcheon, postmodern parody is that parody which “does not disregard the context of the past 
representations it cites, but uses irony to acknowledge the fact that we are inevitably separated 
from that past today - by time and by the subsequent history of those representations” (2002: 90) 
and that it “is a kind of contesting revision or rereading of the past that both confirms and 
subverts the power of the representations of history” (2002: 91). This simultaneous confirmation 
and subversion happens in that Carson posits herself in a similar position as Stesichoros, that is, 
in the position of the author/poet whose writing inevitably problematizes the past. This is the 
case for Stesichoros because his writing traverses the boundaries between myth and reality, 
making the two overlap. Since all accounts of the blinding of Stesichoros are captured in the 
work of other poets (Suidas, Isokrates) - any serious attempt at answering this question is 
consequentially rendered doubtful from the start. Carson’s writing problematizes the past because 
her relationship to Stesichoros has some semblance with Stesichoros’ relationship with Helen. 
Whereas Stesichoros was supposedly able to directly address Helen, similarly Carson directly 
addresses Stesichoros, and, through parody, appears to take his traversing of boundaries between 
the historical real and mythology seriously, as was shown by her use of Aristotelian syllogistics to 
investigate the past.  
But as these syllogistics unraveled into absurdity, they ended up only complicating the 
possibility to gain knowledge of this past even further. Coming back to Hutcheon’s primary 
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question regarding historiographic metafiction (how can we know that past today and what can we 
know of it?) Carson elucidates the inevitable impossibility of this question, but adds another 
dimension to it: where can we know it? As only fragments of Stesichoros’own writing and writing 
concerning him going blind remain, we are forced to look at other texts which deal with this 
event. In Plato’s Phaedrus, the following (lost) fragments of Stesichoros’s Palinode are recounted 
(through Socrates): 
 
So, my friend, I need to be purified. There is an ancient purification for those who have 
erred in muthologia, one which Homer did not perceive, but Stesichorus did. For when he 
was robbed of his eyes because of his slander of Helen, he was not ignorant like Homer, 
but since he was mousikos he knew the cause, and created immediately: 
‘This is not a true story,  
You did not embark in the broad-benched ships, 
You did not reach the citadel of Troy.’ (2006: 48) 
 
Stesichoros, upon being blinded, created a new verse in order for Helen to give him back his 
sight. What Carson then does is forcing us to ask how we can deal with what we may call the 
‘heterotopic quality’ of mythology, as that space where different levels of myth (the Geryoneis of 
Stesichoros and her own AOR narrative) as well as the underlying language of the historical real 
can overlap and the lines between these three become blurred, the resolution concerning which 
terminology belongs to what level of language ultimately being suspended. In the third chapter I 
shall delve into this issue further. 
  
II 
Carson’s second preliminary text is entitled Red Meat: Fragments of Stesichoros. These fragments 
however, are not scholarly attempts at a serious translation, but rather a reworking based on the 
fragments, which Geryon partially uses in the main AOR narrative. We can compare Carson’s 
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reworking of a fragment with Curtis’ attempt at a precise translation of the same fragment.  
Curtis’ translation is as follows: “the arrow went straight into the crown of his head, and his 
armour and his gory limbs were stained with blood; and Geryon tilted his neck like a poppy when 
spoiling its gentle body suddenly drops its petals…” (2011: 84). Whereas Carson’s reworking of 
the fragment is: “Arrow means kill It parted Geryon’s skull like a comb Made The boy neck lean 
At an odd slow angle sideways as when a Poppy shames itself in a whip of Nude breeze” (13). 
This comparison shows how easy it would be for confusion to arise whether Carson’s fragments 
are an attempt at serious translation if we did not have another translation to compare it to, as 
several elements (the arrow in his head, the tilting of the neck) are present in both texts. The 
comparison also reveals to us the differences between the two and how Carson is already 
reworking Stesichoros’ fragments in order to better fit her own work: in Curtis’ translation there 
is no mention of Geryon being a boy, but in Carson’s work there is, which, as a rhetoric device, 
smooths the transition of the fragments into the AOR narrative. In doing this, the original 
fragments are reworked in a metalingual system, i.e.: a system where different layers of language 
are chronologically ‘stacked’ and inform the language beneath it. In the case of AOR, these are 
the original (remaining) fragments, the reworking of the fragments, and the usage of these 
fragments in the AOR narrative. As such AOR has turned into a semiological system, as defined 
by Roland Barthes in Myth Today (originally published in 1957), a text that was published as part 
of Mythologies (2009): “This is the case with mythology: it is a part both of semiology inasmuch as 
it is a formal science, and of ideology inasmuch as it is an historical science: it studies ideas-in-
form” (135). This concept of myth as idea-in-form is important to Barthes because to him 
“Semiology is a science of forms, since it studies significations apart from their content” (134). 
Moreover “one cannot speak about structures in terms of forms, and vice versa. It may well be 
that on the plane of 'life', there is but a totality where structures and forms cannot be separated” 
(134). To study the way the different levels of myth and the language of the historical real are 
related, I shall analyze them as a metalingual system, because, as Barthes writes: “the more a 
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system is specifically defined in its forms, the more amenable it is to historical criticism. To 
parody a well-known saying, I shall say that a little formalism turns one away from History, but 
that a lot brings one back to it” (134). As such, a subversive strategy that simultaneously resists 
and elucidates how mythology is produced may arise. Mythology, as a type of language, is always 
based on a historical foundation: “for myth is a type of speech chosen by history: it cannot 
possibly evolve from the ‘nature’ of things” (132). As such, the subversive strategy in my case is 
trans-historical: if its origins are based on the historicity of Stesichoros’ fragments, we can use the 
representational model of a metalingual system as designed by Barthes in order to explore how 
the different layers of myth relate to each other in the case of AOR:  
 
 
         (Source: Mythologies, 138) 
 
In order to avoid confusion in terminology, in the layer of myth in the model, Barthes dubs the 
signifier the form and the signified the concept. “Unlike the form, the concept is in no way abstract: 
it is filled with a situation. Through the concept, it is a whole new history which is implanted in 
the myth” (142). It is imperative that we acknowledge that in this specific case, the level of 
language is already mythological, as that level is the Geryoneis. That is to say, we take the form and 
concept of the first myth and transpose it into a new one.  
Yet through the transposition of the myth-as-sign to another myth, Carson resists parts of 
the concept of Stesichoros’ Geryoneis myth as she creates her own. This is possible, because as 
Barthes states: “In actual fact, the knowledge contained in a mythical concept is confused, made 
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of yielding, shapeless associations. One must firmly stress this open character of the concept; it is 
not at all an abstract, purified essence, it is a formless, unstable, nebulous condensation, whose 
unity and coherence are above all due to its function” (143). As such, it is through the nebulous 
and fragmentary nature of the concept of Stesichoros’ myth that Carson is able to create her own. 
As the model shows, concept and form are ultimately part of the sign in the layer of myth (in this 
layer, Barthes dubs the sign the signification). Consequently, when the concept is changed, the form 
is changed as well. Carson appropriates names and locations from Stesichoros’ myth, but the 
signifieds of these names and locations has changed since they are appropriated in a new myth, 
incorporating elements of the signifieds from the old sign (Geryon as monster) with new ones 
(Geryon as teenage homosexual), which are themselves also signifying. As we have seen in 
chapter 1, this diffusion and appropriation of signs also takes place on the level of narrative and 
morality. In Stesichoros’ account, Geryon is slain because Herakles has to obtain the cattle from 
Geryon in order to fulfill his tenth labor as commanded by Eurystheus.  
The parallel between Stesichoros’ account and Carson’s appropriation is that Geryon is 
the scapegoat in both stories. In both stories Geryon’s form is monstrous, which is used as the 
incentive to instigate violence in order for Herakles to take what he wants (in the Geryoneis this is 
Geryon’s cattle, in AOR it is to be desired by Geryon). In Carson’s myth, Geryon does not want 
to defend his cattle (or even has cattle), but rather falls in love with Herakles. Thus in the 
metalingual form we have a transitional form. The entire sign of Geryon as scapegoat through his 
monstrosity, with a non-transitional new concept, as the incentive for mimetic violence, has 
shifted from the cattle to desire. It is these transitional forms that seemingly allow us to decipher 
meaning in the myth. But myth is always a double system. As we have seen, on the level of 
mythology Barthes calls it form, but as the final term of the linguistic level Barthes calls it 
meaning.  But as we can see in the model, the form has its own signified on the level of myth, the 
concept. The meaning presents the form, but the form outdistances the meaning. This is because 
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when it has arrived, the meaning also acts as point of departure for a new signification, 
consequently presenting the form. Barthes explains this through the following metaphor: 
 
If I am in a car and I look at the scenery through the window, I can at will focus on the 
scenery or on the window-pane. At one moment I grasp the presence of the glass and the 
distance of the landscape; at another, on the contrary, the transparency of the glass and 
the depth of the landscape; but the result of this alternation is constant: the glass is at 
once present and empty to me, and the landscape unreal and full. The same thing occurs 
in the mythical signifier: its form is empty but present, its meaning absent but full. (147) 
 
Barthes’ metaphor reveals that the issue of deciphering meaning in the myth is a question of 
focus: through focusing on one form-meaning relation we will inevitably neglect another. But this 
reveals to us a particular quality of the nature of myth. Because of its double system nature, the 
metalingual model as a form of representation cannot but be distorting: “However paradoxical it 
may seem, myth hides nothing: its function is to distort, not to make disappear. There is no 
latency of the concept in relation to the form: there is no need of an unconscious in order to 
explain myth” (154). Barthes use of the term latency here is meant to reveal that, in a temporal 
dimension, both the form and the concept present themselves at the same time (being part of a 
single sign), but the concept is able to outdistance the form in that the concept is nebulous, hazy 
and unstable. The form however, is spatial; that is to say, related to place and proximity (for 
example, in narrativity). 
It is because of its nebulous nature that the concept is able to distort meaning. “The 
meaning is already complete, it postulates a kind of knowledge, a past, a memory, a comparative 
order of facts, ideas, decisions” (140-141). Barthes’ metaphor revealed that we are only able to 
perceive only a part of the meaning each time we focus. This suggests a sequence, an order in 
which we focus on the meaning in the myth:  
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To keep a spatial metaphor, the approximative character of which I have already stressed, 
I shall say that the signification of the myth is constituted by a sort of constantly moving 
turnstile which presents alternately the meaning of the signifier and its form, a language 
object and a metalanguage, a purely signifying and a purely imagining consciousness. This 
alternation is, so to speak, gathered up in the concept, which uses it like an ambiguous 
signifier, at once intellective and imaginary, arbitrary and natural. (146-147) 
 
It is here that we touch upon the politics of myth, and of reading myth. In my reading of the 
novel as a text of persecution in the first chapter, I demonstrated that on the level of language, 
we are confronted with ambiguous signs that reveal a double system: its underlying conceptual 
codes (incest and pedophilea) referred to what Girard dubbed the historical real, presented in the 
form of mythological language. Myth is depoliticized speech, but that does not render it a-
political; on the contrary, it is a form covering its political and ideological codes. The ambiguity 
of the signs in a double system reveals mythology’s political potential. Through the nebulosity of 
the concept, its entire meaning can never fully stabilize. Close reading becomes then a form of 
deconstruction of the myth. However, this deconstruction can take place only when we attempt 
to read the entire whole of the signifier (that is, the myth as a complete sign): “Finally, if I focus 
on the mythical signifier as on an inextricable whole made of meaning and form, I receive an 
ambiguous signification: I respond to the constituting mechanism of myth, to its own dynamics, I 
become a reader of myths” (153). This emphasis on the whole sign here can be related to 
Barthes’ metaphor of the turnstile, where every aspect of the myth has to be read in order to be 
able to construct the myth as complete signifier. But this is rendered impossible because of its 
ambiguous signification due to its nature as a double system and the alternating, sequential nature 
of the turnstile: when we focus on one aspect, we cannot simultaneously focus on another, let 
alone the mythical signifier as a whole. Myth as whole signifier confronts the reader of myths 
with the politics of his/her reading. Since the reading of the mythical signifier is a sequential 
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process, this automatically makes it a selective process as well. In my reading of AOR as a text of 
persecution, I automatically ignore and neglect reading the myth-as-signifier in other ways. This 
neglect unveils the myth as a prime example of a text scriptible as it challenges the subject position 
of the reader and forces him to acknowledge the explosion of codes he/she is confronted with in 
the text; a manifestation of jouissance. 
It is through the deconstructive act of close reading that we can shed light on the myth, 
and make the transition from semiology into ideology: “it is the reader of myths himself who 
must reveal their essential function. How does he receive this particular myth today? If he 
receives it in an innocent fashion, what is the point of proposing it to him? And if he reads it 
using his powers of reflection, like the mythologist, does it matter which alibi is presented?” It is 
these questions that are the point of departure for the final part of this chapter. Through the 
postmodern forms of historiographical metafiction and parody, a subversive strategy against 
myth develops, as Carson develops a system of representation which itself represents a system of 
representation. 
 
III 
In the main AOR narrative Geryon sets out to author an autobiography. Though I will delve 
deeper into an analysis of this process in the third chapter, for now I want to focus on a specific 
case. When Geryon learns to write, he starts his autobiography as follows: 
 
 
Total Facts Known About Geryon. 
Geryon was a monster everything about him was red. Geryon lived 
on an island in the Atlantic called the Red Place. Geryon’s mother 
was a river that runs to the sea the Red Joy River Geryon’s father  
was gold. Some say that Geryon had six hands six feet some say wings. 
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Geryon was red so were his strange red cattle. Herakles came one 
day killed Geryon got the cattle.  
 
He followed Facts with Questions and Answers. 
 
QUESTIONS Why did Herakles kill Geryon? 
1. Just violent. 
2. Had to it was one of His Labors (10th). 
3. Got the idea that Geryon was Death otherwise he could live forever. 
FINALLY 
Geryon had a little red dog Herakles killed that too. (37) 
 
Of course, the Geryon that writes down this narrative as autobiography never experiences it. 
Rather, what appears to be the case is that it is a representation of what would be the 
autobiography of the Geryon from the remaining fragments of Stesichoros’ Geryoneis poem. This 
representation, then, is a demonstration of Barthes’ metalingual system. While both form and 
meaning in both iterations is the name ‘Geryon’, it refers both to the signified on the level of 
language (in this case, the narrative of the Geryoneis), but of course also its own corresponding 
concept on the level of myth (that is both its own narrative and the entire history of the myth 
behind the signifier ‘Geryon’). However, the underlying level of the metalingual model, that is, on 
the level of language, is in this instance simply more myth (since it is Stesichoros’ Geryoneis). As 
such, the meaning (the final term, or sign, of the first level and the first term, or signifier, of the 
second level) is already mythological. To go back to the turnstile metaphor, this is only 
strengthened further because on the level of language we are dealing with fragmentary material of 
a once complete narrative.  
The fragmentary nature of the source material makes it ideal to be mythologized, for as 
Barthes states: “myth prefers to work with poor, incomplete images, where the meaning is already 
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relieved of its fat, and ready for a signification, such as caricatures, pastiches, symbols, etc.” (151). 
An example of this in the text is the caricature of the ‘little red dog’, which in fact refers to 
Orthus, the brother of Cerberus, and Geryon’s hound in Stesichoros’ Geryoneis. The sign ‘little red 
dog’ in itself does not automatically signify Orthus, but because we have the layer of the myth of 
the Geryoneis below it we can interpret this as signifying ‘Orthus’. As such, we have a poetic 
representation of the metalingual system captured in the AOR narrative. But this representation 
does not stop it from producing myth in turn: “the very resistance offered by poetry makes it an 
ideal prey for myth: the apparent lack of order of signs, which is the poetic facet of an essential 
order, is captured by myth, and transformed into an empty signifier, which will serve to signify 
poetry. This explains the improbable character of modern poetry: by fiercely refusing myth, 
poetry surrenders to it bound hand and foot” (159). This confused or lack of an order through 
the mythologization process is manifested in our case too. Its attempted resistance and attempt 
to distance itself through parody and irony can only go so far; since its original is a fragment, 
even the representation of myth produces more myth because it springs from the incomplete 
image of this fragment, necessarily filling in the holes, adding to the mythological conflict of what 
is historically factual and accurate and what is not.  
 Hutcheon’s original question regarding historiographic metafiction was how we can know 
the past today and what can we know of it. My analysis given above shows that mythology 
dominates these questions as the nature of its fragmentary material invites to question how the 
holes of the work’s history are to be filled. Accordingly, we trace the myth from a study of its 
historicity to its current status, as Barthes states:  
 
Myth lends itself to history in two ways: by its form, which is only relatively motivated; by 
its concept, the nature of which is historical. One can therefore imagine a diachronic 
study of myths, whether one submits them to a retrospection (which means founding an 
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historical mythology) or whether one follows some of yesterday's myths down to their 
present forms (which means founding prospective history). (163) 
 
The form is only relatively motivated because, as stated earlier, the myth needs a fragmentary 
source in order to become myth; to have the space to question its historicity. One aspect of the 
form that I have thus far left undiscussed is that the form of the AOR narrative is novel-in-verse. 
The motivation for this form is paradoxical in terms of Hutcheon’s postmodernism: it is the 
same form as the epic (a form used for many myths), thereby strengthening its status as myth. 
Concurrently, as a postmodern text, it is self-consciously a parody of this same form. The nature 
of AOR’s concept corresponds with Barthes’ definition because The Geryoneis is, of course, 
historical while at the same time as it is mythical. The myth is re-represented, and it is through 
this process that it founds a ‘prospective history’. Thus a diachronic study of this myth is used 
not to create clarity, but rather through a parodic attempt at such a study simply ends up further 
mythologizing its already mythological historicity.  
 Given that a diachronic study of myth produces more mythology, we may (re)consider 
the function of mythology, although it would be too swift to conclude that an escape from 
mythology is de facto impossible.  However, since I have conducted a diachronic study in this 
chapter, how may signs may traverse between different sign systems in a spatial, rather than 
temporal sense? This question is important because such an enquiry would allow for us to 
research how signs may be de- and reterritorialized, and whether this process is possible within a 
mythological system, which calls for a theorization of what we may call ‘textual space’, which 
shall be done in the following chapter.   
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Chapter 3 - Mythology as an abstract machine 
 
I 
In the second chapter, the main objective was to explore how the text investigated its own past, 
which stemmed from another mythological text. Through Barthes’ metalingual system, I traced 
the development of how the signs used in the Geryoneis were distorted and appropriated in AOR. 
This development suggests a voyage or journey of some kind, and was diachronic in nature. But a 
voyage can never be of a temporal nature alone; it also has to have been undertaken in some type 
of space. This begs the question: what is the space through which this journey has taken place?  
In the second chapter I mentioned that AOR has a ‘heterotopical quality’ about it, since it deals 
with different narratives (the Geryoneis and the AOR narrative itself) overlapping in one text, using 
a common signifier (‘Geryon’) for different signifieds (and through metalingual layering creates 
forms, concepts and significations as we have seen in the previous chapter), while concurrently 
covering up its underlying ideological codes. As such, the AOR text is a site where these different 
layers of metalinguality all come together, which is, in Foucault’s definition, what makes it a 
heterotopia: “The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, 
several sites that are in themselves incompatible” (6). But then we have to ask: what is the ‘real 
place’ referred to in our case? And what is the space? It would be tempting to simply say that it is 
the text, but if I am going to claim that there is such a thing as a ‘textual space’, this claim requires 
of me to theorize the nature of textual space.  
To this order let me begin with a difference between the terms ‘work’ and ‘text’. Barthes 
makes the following distinction: 
 
The difference is this: the work is a fragment of substance, occupying a part of the space 
of books (in a library for example), the Text is a methodological field. The opposition 
may recall (without at all reproducing term for term) Lacan's distinction between 'reality' 
and 'the real': the one is displayed, the other demonstrated; likewise, the work can be seen 
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(in bookshops, in catalogues, in exam syllabuses), the text is a process of demonstration, 
speaks according to certain rules (or against certain rules); the work can be held in the 
hand, the text is held in language, only exists in the movement of a discourse (or rather, it 
is Text for the very reason that it knows itself as text); the Text is not the decomposition 
of the work, it is the work that is the imaginary tail of the Text; or again, the Text is 
experienced only in an activity of production. It follows that the Text cannot stop (for example 
on a library shelf); its constitutive movement is that of cutting across (in particular, it can 
cut across the work, several works). (1977: 156-157) 
 
Barthes’ distinction here is complex. While the work can be ‘held in the hand’ it is also the 
‘imaginary tail of the Text’. For Barthes, the work is then an idea or concept, just as Text is an 
idea or concept. The work is a place in the sense that it can be displayed and held, hence we can 
point out where the work is. The ‘Text’ is that space (a methodological field) where several spaces 
(layers of historical language and myth) come together. Taking this distinction as our point of 
departure, we can ask: what is textual space like? The final sentence of the quote above shows 
that Text (not work) is directional - since it is itself a cutting across, creating a path. Further on, 
Barthes employs more spatial metaphors, which give us some insight into the nature of textual 
space: 
 
The Text is plural. Which is not simply to say that it has several meanings, but that it 
accomplishes the very plural of meaning: an irreducible (and not merely an acceptable) 
plural. The Text is not a co-existence of meanings but a passage, an overcrossing; thus it 
answers not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an explosion, a dissemination. 
The plural of the Text depends, that is, not on the ambiguity of its contents but on what 
might be called the stereographic plurality of its weave of signifiers (etymologically, 
the text is a tissue, a woven fabric). (1977: 159) 
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Here Barthes’ use of spatial metaphors (“a passage/overcrossing”) again confirms the Text’s 
directionality. Secondly, the stereographic plurality suggests depth (dimensionality) and its “weave 
of signifiers” again, when read spatially, suggests a rhizomatic nature. The term ‘tissue’ should be 
read here in terms of the Text as a methodological field, which the reader creates in his act of 
reading as producing the Text, opposing a hermeneutical approach where a comprehensive 
‘meaning’ (or ‘co-existence of meanings’) of the Text would be the object desired to be produced: 
“The logic regulating the Text is not comprehensive (define 'what the work means') but 
metonymic; the activity of associations, contiguities, carryings-over coincides with a liberation of 
symbolic energy” (1977: 158). For Barthes,  the Textual produced is the explosion of codes the 
reader produces through the act of reading itself, which is why what matters is that these codes 
constantly signify, rather than that the Text ‘answers to an interpretation’.   
Though Barthes’ metaphors are certainly spatial in nature, his suggestion here pertains 
more to the intertextual nature of the Text. The different qualities concerning Text that I have so 
far deduced from his analyses (rhizomatic as it can cut across works, directional, dimensional), 
align better with Gilles Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s philosophy on space, particularly their 
differentiation between smooth and striated space. The main differences between these two lies 
in the way space is approached. Space is striated when we seek to quantify it metrically, and is 
smooth when we experience this space as a space of different affects. But since the 
differentiation here lies in the way space is approached, there are similarities as well: “Of course, 
there are points, lines, and surfaces in striated space as well as in smooth space (there are also 
volumes, but we will leave this question aside for the time being). In striated space, lines or 
trajectories tend to be subordinated to points: one goes from one point to another. In the 
smooth, it is the opposite: the points are subordinated to the trajectory … In smooth space, the 
line is therefore a vector, a direction and not a dimension or metric determination. It is a space 
constructed by local operations involving changes in direction” (556). Going back to Barthes’ 
analyses of the Text, we can see now that his analysis of textual ‘cutting across’ corresponds with 
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Deleuze’s and Guattari's theory of smooth space. Similarly, we can see that Barthes’ idea of a 
‘work’ is a form of striated space in the sense that the idea of the work is finite, measurable and 
quantifiable, as it can be regarded and held. 
As I have stated earlier, smooth space can become striated space. Though Deleuze and 
Guattari never developed a ‘textual’ model, they did develop a technological, musical, maritime, 
mathematical, physical and finally an aesthetic model. From these models we may be able to learn 
what type of qualities such a textual model would need to possess. For example, Deleuze and 
Guattari explain how the sea is a smooth space par excellence, but can become striated when 
divided in coordinates and subsequently navigated. Text is similar in this sense as it is smooth in 
its process of being produced (read), but striated when interpreted. If the Text can cut across several 
works and it is experienced only in act of production, we should read these quotes in the context 
of Barthes’ move from (the death of the) author to (the birth of the) reader. The reader is able to 
trace themes, motifs and codes across several works, and thus it is his/her reading which is an act 
of production of Text. Different ways of analyzing a Text will consequently arrange textual space 
in different ways. For example, a narratological approach would arrange the Text into striated 
space. This is because a narratological approach divides a narrative into ‘events’ (on the level of 
fabula) and then follow how these events are chronologically arranged (on the level of story). 
Through this arrangement of narrative in ‘events’ (points), textual space becomes striated; the 
emphasis lies on the identification of the points through which we can navigate the Text’s 
trajectory, making the trajectory subordinate to the points themselves. It is important to note that 
a narratological approach would divide textual space in a spatiotemporal manner: A kind of 
‘literary cartography’ is executed through creating a map of narrative based on events (as they 
appear chronologically), not through mapping out the various (fictious) spaces in the Text (in so 
far as this would even be possible). To go back to Barthes suggestion of Text as a fabric, the 
narratological method untangles textual space, through mapping out a narrative in terms of 
events. This corresponds to Deleuze’s and Guattari’s thought concerning lines and points: 
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Let us return to the simple opposition between the smooth and the striated since we are 
not yet at the point where we can consider the dissymmetrical and concrete mixes. The 
smooth and the striated are distinguished first of all by an inverse relation between the 
point and the line (in the case of the striated, the line is between two points, while in the 
smooth, the point is between two lines); and second, by the nature of the line (smooth-
directional, open intervals; dimensional-striated, closed intervals). Finally, there is a third 
difference, concerning the surface or space. In striated space, one closes off a surface and 
"allocates" it according to determinate intervals, assigned breaks; in the smooth, one 
"distributes" oneself in an open space, according to frequencies and in the course of one's 
crossings. (559) 
 
I link this passage to Barthes’ thoughts concerning Text in that for Barthes’ the production of the 
Text should be a smooth space in the sense that the reader has to distribute him/herself 
according to the affects that they come across. For Barthes (and as we will come to see later, 
Deleuze and Guattari as well), what is affective is that the signs signify to the reader. Because 
signifiation (language “that enables a text to signify what representative and communicative speech 
does not say” Roudiez in Kristeva, 1980: 18) is affective a whole, full completion of the signified 
is not possible here; the affect keeps on signifying.  Secondly, since the reader creates the text 
through an act of production (the reading itself), this allows for the reader to create 
passages/pathways through different works, which corresponds to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
thought concerning the distribution of oneself in an open (textual) space. Deleuze and Guattari 
make an important distinction between smooth and striated space by mentioning the inverse 
relation between point and line. To come back to the textual model, this means that through the 
act of reading we are, in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s terms, producing Text directionally, but through 
shifting production towards interpretation our approach towards the Text becomes dimensional.  
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II 
Having established the differences between smooth and striated space in relation to the Text, we 
need to turn back to AOR in order to see how this theory relates to this specific case. If we speak 
of Text in terms of space, what kind of voyage do the characters in a narrative make (again, in a 
spatial sense)? Deleuze and Guattari offer us the following insight: 
 
Voyage in place: that is the name of all intensities, even if they also develop in extension. 
To think is to voyage; earlier we tried to establish a theo-noological model of smooth and 
striated spaces. In short, what distinguishes the two kinds of voyages is neither a 
measurable quantity of movement, nor something that would be only in the mind, but the 
mode of spatialization, the manner of being in space, of being for space … Voyaging 
smoothly is a becoming, and a difficult, uncertain becoming at that. (561) 
 
We can then ask: who (or what) makes this voyage, and in what way is the space in which it ‘takes 
place’ smooth and/or striated? Secondly, since (as shown in chapter 2) AOR was read as a 
postmodern text, is this voyage parodic or self-reflexive, and if so, in what way?  
To attempt to answer these questions, I first want to elucidate the different levels on 
which this voyaging is taken place. The first level is that the sign ‘Geryon’ has started to voyage. 
The signifier ‘Geryon’ in the Geryoneis is the same signifier (‘Geryon’) in the narrative of AOR, 
but their respective signifieds are, of course, not identical. As I have shown in the metalingual 
model of chapter 2, the entire sign ‘Geryon’ from the Geryoneis becomes part of the concept of the 
signification (the sign on the level of the AOR myth) ‘Geryon’. Secondly, the narrative of AOR also 
shows how mythology is used to cover up ideological codes within the AOR narrative itself. In 
this sense, we have two metalingual systems that seem to be running parallel: the first system 
would consist of what Girard dubs the language of the historical real on the level of language, 
and then the narrative of AOR on the level of myth. The second system would be the Geryoneis 
myth on the level of language, and again AOR on the level of myth. The problem with 
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conceptualizing two different (vertical) metalingual systems in this way is that (as Barthes himself 
would state later on) Text is only experienced in an act of production (reading), and that in this 
process the metalingual systems are bound to overlap (since Text cuts across), rather than simply 
existing side by side. In this sense, the vertical metalingual system falls short of being an adequate 
form of representation. Deleuze and Guattari propose a different, circular model, to which we 
shall come back, but first I want to discuss another form of voyaging that is presented in AOR. 
 After Herakles leaves Geryon, Geryon travels to Buenos Aires. As I mentioned in chapter 
2, One of the main subjects in the AOR narrative is the way Geryon creates his autobiography 
(hence its title). As such, it is, then, a biographical narrative of an autobiographical voyage (and in 
this sense, we also have elements of a bildungsroman), and it is this self-reflexiveness which is a 
hallmark of AOR as a postmodern text. The sign Geryon has made a voyage from one sign 
system (the Geryoneis) towards another (AOR).  The semblance between the two voyages is that in 
the first case, the sign has traversed between two sign systems, whereas the voyage to Buenos 
Aires I interpret, not just as an event in the narrative, but as a (self-reflexive) representation of a sign 
traversing in (or perhaps attempts to escape, as we shall see later) its own sign system. 
Consequently, this makes this voyage iconic because it imitates the earlier voyage. Thus, we can 
also read the creation of an autobiography as a sign reflecting on its own voyage (from one work, 
the Geryoneis, to another, AOR, cutting across a textual space) and also as a sign creating more 
signs (the writing and photographs created through his autobiography), its own semiotic system, 
also known as a regime of signs. Concerning regimes of signs, Deleuze and Guattari state: 
 
If we call the signifying semiotic system semiology, then semiology is only one regime of 
signs among others, and not the most important one. Hence the necessity of a return to 
pragmatics, in which language never has universality in itself, self-sufficient formalization, 
a general semiology, or a metalanguage. Thus it is the study of the signifying regime that 
first testifies to the inadequacy of linguistic presuppositions, and in the very name of 
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regimes of signs. (130) 
 
Deleuze and Guattari distinct several terms here that need to be elaborated. Earlier we saw that 
for Barthes, semiology studies ideas in form (2009: 135). This implies that the form of an idea has 
a representational relationship with that idea. Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘regime of signs’. 
They define this term as follows: “We call any specific formalization of expression a regime of 
signs, at least when the expression is linguistic. A regime of signs constitutes a semiotic system. 
But it appears difficult to analyze semiotic systems in themselves: there is always a form of 
content that is simultaneously inseparable from and independent of the form of expression, and 
the two forms pertain to assemblages that are not principally linguistic” (129). When Deleuze and 
Guattari state that semiology (as the signifying semiotic system) is only one regime of signs 
among others, they consequently contest the idea of representation itself, or more specifically, 
argue that representation is just one way signs may relate to one another. By employing 
networked, circular models, Deleuze and Guattari argue that every sign is part of a longer chain 
of signs, which is connected to other chains, which is why language does not have a “universality 
in itself” in the sense that it is not a closed off, finite system (which the representation of a 
metalanguage appears to be). Secondly, the circular model presupposes that there is neither a 
beginning nor an ending in the way one sign relates to another. This is important because this 
accentuates their emphasis on the importance of directionality. By following a regime of signs in 
one direction, the sequential order in which we encounter the signs is different, and thus the way 
we may interpret the way these signs relate to one another (and, consequently, the way they 
signify) becomes different as well. They employ this term as part of a larger argument concerning 
the way regimes of signs operate between (and in) the State apparatus and the nomadic war 
machine. In our case it is not the State apparatus that is the regime of signs that concerns us, but 
rather the position of one sign (Geryon) in relation to the regime of mythology that this sign is a 
part of.  
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Geryon shifts from writing the caricatured biography of the Geryon of the Geryoneis to 
capturing his own biography by means of photography. Thus, not only is there a shift in what is 
artistically expressed, but the form of expression shifts as well, from writing to photography. In 
relation to Deleuze’s and Guattari’s statement, I read this as a resistance against the regime of 
signs of mythology that Geryon is caught in, towards employing his photography as way of 
creating his own regime of signs (that is, a specific formalization of expression). Throughout the 
narrative, Geryon ponders the following question: 
 
“What is time made of?” is a question that had long exercised Geryon. 
     _______ 
Everywhere he went he asked people. Yesterday for example at the university. 
Time is an abstraction - just a meaning 
that we impose upon motion. Geryon is thinking this answer over as he kneels 
beside the bathtub in his hotel room 
stirring photographs back and forth in the developing solution. He picks out 
one of the prints and pins it 
to a clotheslines strung between the television and the door. It is a photograph  
of some people sitting at desks 
in a classroom. The desks look too small for them - but Geryon is not interested 
in human comfort. Much truer 
is the time that strays into photographs and stops. High on the wall hangs a white  
electric clock. It says five minutes to six. (93) 
 
This example shows how Geryon uses his photography as a representation of the representation 
of time (via the clock). Time “stops” because the clock is captured in the form of a photograph. 
Thus what we are left with is a representation of a representation which is deemed “much truer”. 
Because this representation signifies the idea of time in its photographic form, it makes it both 
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inseparable to this specific form of the expression of that idea as well independent in the sense 
that this idea could very well be expressed in a different form. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, 
the signified of the clock (five minutes to six) is not what matters here, but rather what matters is 
that the photographic representation itself signifies continuously (since it signifies an idea), 
without resulting in a saturated signified. 
What is postmodern about this example is that it is self-reflexive in that a return to 
semiotic pragmatics, by which I mean a return to a focus on the relationship between a sign and 
its agents and interpreters. This is demonstrated as a textual sign (Geryon) is the agent, 
attempting to voyage from one regime of signs (that of mythology) towards creating his own in 
the form of his autobiography. I read the autobiography here as a regime of signs as every sign 
(pieces of writing, photographs) within that regime signifies the autobiographic and 
representational connection it has to Geryon. When read as postmodern self-reflexivity, what 
becomes particularly important is that the photographs themselves are represented not through 
images, but language. In the previous example we had then a linguistic representation of a 
photograph, which in itself was a representation of the idea of time.  We come across another 
manifestation of this issue further in the novel: “XL. PHOTOGRAPHS: ORIGIN OF TIME. It 
is a photograph of four people sitting around a table with hands in front of them” (136). When 
Deleuze and Guattari state that there is always a form of content that is simultaneously 
inseparable from and independent of the form of expression and not principally linguistic, this is 
illustrated because the description of the photograph (its linguistic form) gives us the idea of what 
this photograph would be like, which in turn could be described again. Let us consider the adage 
‘a picture is worth a thousand words’. This is clear because the description of a photograph will 
fail us continuously in its inability to answer questions that may arise (are the hands 
holding/doing anything? Are they resting on the table? etc.) when we try to hold the idea of the 
photograph in our minds, due to its lack of detail. Of course, even if this description was longer 
and these particular questions would be answered, new problems would arise because more 
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questions could be asked based on the new/extended text that were provided to answer the 
previous ones, ad infinitum. The issue being raised here, is that the inverse is equally true (a thousand 
words are ‘worth’ more than one picture, or even a single word can be worth more than a 
thousand pictures). Representations of representations become signs that are referring to others 
signs, as part of an endless signifying chain: 
 
There is a simple general formula for the signifying regime of the sign (the signifying 
sign): every sign refers to another sign, and only to another sign, ad infinitum. That is 
why, at the limit, one can forgo the notion of the sign, for what is retained is not 
principally the sign's relation to a state of things it designates, or to an entity it signifies, 
but only the formal relation of sign to sign insofar as it defines a so-called signifying 
chain. The limitlessness of signifiance replaces the sign. When denotation (here, 
designation and signification taken together) is assumed to be part of connotation, one is 
wholly within this signifying regime of the sign … The signifier is the sign in redundancy 
with the sign. All signs are signs of signs. The question is not yet what a given sign 
signifies but to which other signs it refers, or which signs add themselves to it to form a 
network without beginning or end that projects its shadow onto an amorphous 
atmospheric continuum. (130) 
 
If the question has moved from what the sign signifies, to which other signs it refers, we smooth 
textual space because we follow the trajectory of this sign.  
Let us follow, as an example, the sign ‘red’ through the AOR narrative. Geryon himself is 
red. So are his dreams, his thoughts, it is red when he waits, the piece of chalk he has to write on 
a school board with is red, the lava flowing out from a volcano is red, a red butterfly flies by him, 
and on and on. If we would follow this sign as a hermeneutical code we would be inclined to read 
this as allegory, and attempt to uncover a deeper meaning through following it. This impulse 
would striate textual space: every iteration of the sign ‘red’ would be a point in this space, through 
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which we would be able to navigate (from point to point), and once complete, we would have 
mapped out an allegorical figure and have the possibility to decode it as a sustained metaphor. 
But if we read this as a smooth voyage, we have to return to the title: ‘Autobiography of Red’. 
Indexically, ‘red’ is a continuation of Geryon since his body is red as well. Thus, we have an 
indexical continuation of Geryon into other signs because of the continuation of ‘red’. The sign 
as such is reterritorialized because the indexicality places the two signs in relation to each other 
(and thus establishes a new relationship in the greater regime of signs that they are part of), and 
as such we have two points (the signs) with a line between them (the indexical relationship 
between the signs). In Deleuze’s and Guattari’s terms, if we would read this smoothly (as a space of 
affects), we acknowledge the ‘signifyingness’ of this indexicality but continue our voyage; when 
we start to trace these points (the iterations of the ‘red’ sign) as part of an allegorical figure, we 
start to striate textual space. When read this way, every iteration of ‘red’ becomes an indexical 
continuation of Geryon, and in this sense, what matters is not what the sign ‘red’ signifies every 
time we come across it, but rather, that we come across it at all, which is what Deleuze and 
Guattari dub the ‘signifyingness’ of the sign: we cannot constitute the meaning of the encounter 
with such a sign right away, but we cannot escape the fact that the encounter with the sign 
signifies.  
 A potential allegorical explanation of the ‘red’ sign is never revealed, even though the sign 
slips into Geryon’s photography as well. What happens accordingly is that (again, when read as 
postmodern reflexivity) this question of signifyingness is duplicated from the reader of the Text 
to a form of representation. It is Geryon himself who is constantly confronted with the sign, who 
is confronted with what it can mean to be ‘red’, what it means to have red thoughts and red 
dreams and to come across red objects. As such, it is the allegorical impulse itself which has 
become the object that is represented. The question then lies not with the one (the reader who 
traces the sign, who experiences the allegorical impulse through reading) or the other (the sign 
which is aware of the same potential signifiance of the sign), but both reader and sign share in the 
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questioning of signifyingness in the regime of signs that Geryon is a part of. As Deleuze and 
Guattari explain, this chain of signs (the iterations of ‘red’) in a regime of signs becomes a circular 
model:  
 
Not only do signs form an infinite network, but the network of signs is infinitely circular. 
The statement survives its object, the name survives its owner. Whether it passes into 
other signs or is kept in reserve for a time, the sign survives both its state of things and its 
signified; it leaps like an animal or a dead person to regain its place in the chain and invest 
a new state, a new signified, from which it will in turn extricate itself. (131)  
 
This statement reveals to us possibilities that the linear verticality of the metalingual model did 
not. If each circle constitutes a separate regime of signs, these circles can overlap (like Venn 
diagrams), and signs that are part of one regime can become part of another. Taking Deleuze’s 
and Guattari’s example (the name that survives its ‘owner’), we can investigate now how Barthes 
ideas of ‘form’ and ‘concept’ relate with Deleuze’s and Guattari’s circular model. When the sign 
‘Geryon’ in the Geryoneis is divided into a signifier (the name itself) and the signified (the character 
behind the name), on the level of myth that entire sign becomes a form when it is carried from the 
Geryoneis to the Geryon of AOR. The concept (signified on the second level) of this Geryon is 
infused with the entire sign of the Geryon of the Geryoneis, but also with our reading of the AOR 
narrative. Combined, they are the signification (the sign on the level of myth). While this process 
seems linear (as is the case in a vertical metalingual system), this is not necessarily the case, as it is 
dependent on the directionality of reading (that is, producing in a Barthesian sense). If we were to 
read AOR before we read the Geryoneis the circle of the regime of signs is traced the other way 
around; likewise if we read the Geryoneis first and AOR second, a different Text would be 
produced. This supports the theory of the way we can smoothly voyage through textual space, as 
what matters is the directionality. Secondly, the sign ‘Geryon’ is not limited to these two works 
alone; for example, another being bearing that name appears in Dante Alighieri’s Divine Comedy, 
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appearing as a creature with a man’s head, the body of a wyvern, and the paws of a lion (akin to a 
manticore). This multitudinous usage of the name explains Deleuze’s and Guattari’s circular 
models, where signs can travel from one circle to the next, depending on how they overlap, 
which, in a Barthesian sense, depends on the way the reader produces the Text. This act of 
production of the Text is dependent on the number of circles of regimes of signs we can 
differentiate: “But what counts is less the circularity of the signs than the multiplicity of the 
circles or chains. The sign refers not only to other signs in the same circle, but to signs in other 
circles or spirals as well” (131). This is because, as in a Venn diagram, these circles can overlap 
and thus allow one sign to be deterritorialized from one circle to another. But this is only possible 
when we are able to recognize the various circles the sign is a part of; the fewer the circles 
recognized in our production of the Text, the fewer are the ways in which can see follow the 
trajectories of the sign and the way it is deterritorialized and reterritorialized. Both of these 
processes are paramount because the possibility of an absolute deterritorialization would allow 
for Geryon to escape from one regime to another. 
 
III 
Earlier we made the distinction between reading as a smooth voyage and interpretation/analysis 
as a striated one (in textual space). Similarly to the way smooth and striated space still constitute 
the same space (but are approached differently), so reading and interpretation switch between 
smooth and striated as well:  
 
There is one other aspect: the signifying regime is not simply faced with the task of 
organizing into circles signs emitted from every direction; it must constantly assure the 
expansion of the circles or spiral, it must provide the center with more signifier to 
overcome the entropy inherent in the system and to make new circles blossom or 
replenish the old. Thus a secondary mechanism in the service of signifiance is necessary: 
interpretance or interpretation. (132) 
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Deleuze and Guattari do not explicitly state why the circles must continue to expand, but its 
reason is not so difficult to guess: If the circles did not expand a kind of intertextual saturation 
point would eventually be reached since it would then be a closed off system and language could 
have a universality in itself, hence Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the term ‘entropy’. This would 
be a static, and in this sense, already metric and a striated space. Furthermore, this expansion of 
circles could be read in several ways, since we could expand the circles already recognized (as in 
augmentation), expand the number of circles, or both. In order to facilitate this expansion we need 
to interpret, as through interpretation we produce Text by producing intertextual relationships. 
But once started, this process cannot come to a halt: 
 
The signified constantly reimparts signifier, recharges it or produces more of it. The form 
always comes from the signifier. The ultimate signified is therefore the signifier itself, in 
its redundancy or "excess." It is perfectly futile to claim to transcend interpretation or 
even communication through the production of signifier, because communication and 
interpretation are what always serve to reproduce and produce signifier. That is certainly 
not the way to revive the notion of production. The discovery of the psychoanalyst-
priests (a discovery every kind of priest or seer made in their time) was that interpretation 
had to be subordinated to signifiance, to the point that the signifier would impart no 
signified without the signified reimparting signifier in its turn. Actually, there is no longer 
even any need to interpret, but that is because the best interpretation, the weightiest and 
most radical one, is an eminently significant silence. (132) 
 
Why do Deleuze and Guattari state that communication and interpretation serve the production 
of the signifier? It is because the signifier itself is only half of the sign, and meaning, even when 
left unsaturated, desires to be produced in the signified, but this signified is never fully saturated 
(since it is part of a sign which is part of circles of regimes of signs that are continuously 
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expanding); hence the reference to the redundancy/excess of the signifier. This is why they argue 
we cannot transcend interpretation, and argue instead that the best interpretation is silence, in our 
case, reading (voyaging smoothly in textual space). 
To go back to my example of the sign ‘red’ from the second part of this chapter, Deleuze 
and Guattari offer us a new insight into reading the indexical continuation of the ‘red’ sign in his 
photography. Because ‘the ultimate signified is the signifier itself’, Geryon does not need to give 
an interpretation of what the iterations of the sign ‘red’ may mean; facilitating an indexical 
continuation of that sign from his life to his autobiography suffices, because this gesture unveils 
to us how this sign can travel from one regime of signs to another. While originally part of the 
regime of signs of mythology of the Geryoneis, Geryon, through indexically continuing the sign in 
his biography, appropriates the sign in his own regime of signs. 
As we saw earlier, Deleuze and Guattari claimed that a smooth voyage is a difficult 
becoming. After my reading of AOR as a text of persecution, we have seen why this is the case 
with Geryon, since he was made a scapegoat. This scapegoating is never done so explicitly. It is 
not a theme to be found in a narrative, as Williams states in the Girard Reader: “Myth camouflages 
scapegoating even as it represents meaning in stories of gods, ancient heroes, foundations of 
social order and ritual, etc.” (1996: 97). Geryon was made a scapegoat by his brother and 
Herakles. In Girard’s theory of mimetic desire, the desire we experience for other objects (who 
act as models) is fueled by our desire to capture that model’s being, in order to accomplish our 
own being, which is the underlying, deeper desire. When Geryon’s brother and Herakles fail to 
possess Geryon’s being, the scapegoat mechanism is activated, and he is abused and left 
behind.  Yet Deleuze and Guattari attribute to the scapegoat a resistance to the regime of signs it 
is a part of: 
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In the signifying regime, the scapegoat represents a new form of increasing entropy in the 
system of signs: it is charged with everything that was "bad" in a given period, that is, 
everything that resisted signifying signs, everything that eluded the referral from sign to 
sign through the different circles; it also assumes everything that was unable to recharge 
the signifier at its center and carries off everything that spills beyond the outermost circle. 
Finally, and especially, it incarnates that line of flight the signifying regime cannot 
tolerate, in other words, an absolute deterritorialization; the regime must block a line of 
this kind or define it in an entirely negative fashion precisely because it exceeds the degree 
of deterritorialization of the signifying sign, however high it may be. The line of flight is 
like a tangent to the circles of signifiance and the center of the signifier. (135) 
 
In chapter one I read AOR as a text of persecution on the level of narrative, but this quote asks 
us to investigate how the scapegoat mechanism works on the level of semiology. Earlier in this 
chapter, I have argued that Geryon resists the regime of signs he was caught in (that of 
mythology), through creating his own regime of signs via his autobiography, from writing the 
biography of the Geryon of the Geryoneis to photographing his own voyage. While I have shown 
how the Geryon sign has travelled from the Geryonis to AOR, the same goes for the character of 
Herakles. Geryon attempts to escape the regime of signs of mythology through creating his 
autobiography, whereas Herakles desires to seduce Geryon in order to possess his being. But 
since this is impossible, he leaves him. Later on, Herakles and Geryon meet again in Buenos 
Aires. Herakles has another man with him, Ancash, who appears to be his lover (Ancash is also 
the name of a region in Peru, where the three travel to). When Ancash sees Geryon’s wings for 
the first time, he reacts the following way: 
 
Ancash ran his fingers slowly 
down the red struts that articulated each wing base. Geryon Shivered. 
He wondered if he was going to faint.  
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… 
Now listen to me Geryon, 
Ancash was saying, 
there’s a village in the mountains north of Huaraz called Jucu and in Jucu 
they believe some strange things. 
It’s a volcanic region. Not active now. In ancient times they worshipped 
the volcano as a god and even 
threw people in it. For sacrifice? Asked Geryon whose head had come out 
of the blanket. 
No not exactly. More like a testing procedure. They were looking for people 
from the inside. Wise ones. 
Holy men I guess you would say. The word in Quechua is Yazcol Yazcamac it means 
The Ones Who Went and Saw and Came Back -  
I think the anthropologists say eyewitnesses. These people did exist. 
Stories are told of them still. 
Eyewitnesses, said Geryon 
Yes. people who saw the inside of the volcano. 
And came back. 
Yes. 
How do they come back? 
Wings. 
Wings? Yes that’s what they say the Yazcamac return as red people with wings, 
all their weaknesses burned away - 
and their mortality. (128-129) 
 
A little later, Geryon feels the attraction to Herakles returning: 
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What Geryon was thinking Herakles never asked. In the space between them 
developed a dangerous cloud. 
Geryon knew he must not go back into the cloud. Desire is no light thing.  
He could see the thorns gleam 
with their black stains. (132-133) 
 
Eventually, however, Geryon is unable to resist Herakles and the two have intercourse. Ancash, 
angry when he finds out, punches Geryon. The two talk it out and Geryon realizes he does not 
really love Herakles anymore. Ancash then says he wants to see Geryon use his wings, and 
Geryon obliges, capturing it through his camera:  
 
He has not flown in years but why not 
be a 
black speck raking its way toward the crater of Icchantikas on icy possibles, 
why not rotate 
the inhuman Andes at a personal angle and retreat when it spins - if it does 
and if not, win 
bolts of wind like slaps of wood and the bitter red drumming of wing muscle on air - 
he flicks Record. 
This is for Ancash, he calls to the earth diminishing below. This is a memory of our 
beauty. He peers down 
at the earth heart of Icchantikas dumping all its photons out her ancient eye and he 
smiles for 
the camera: “The Only Secret People Keep.” (145) 
 
I read Geryon’s realization that he does not love Herakles anymore as another gesture of Geryon 
(the earlier being the autobiographical works he made) towards the rejection of the regime of 
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signs of mythology, since Herakles, like Geryon, is a sign that has travelled from the Geryoneis to 
AOR but is not the same character. Thus, like Geryon, we have the same signifier, but with a 
different signified. Herakles is then indexically connected to the regime of mythology that 
Geryon seeks to escape, and consequently his realization is another step towards rejecting this 
regime. Herakles instead still seeks to possess Geryon, claiming himself to be a “master of 
monsters” (129). Ancash, however, has a different reaction to Geryon’s monstrosity: he sees his 
wings as an opportunity. It is of value to note here that Ancash was not a character in the 
Geryoneis, and as such is a new character and sign in AOR. The fact that he embraces Geryon’s 
monstrosity, rather than use it as a means to incent violence, is therefore of significance. This 
significance comes to bear when Geryon decides to fulfill Ancash wish, documenting his flight in 
the Icchantikas volcano. Geryon’s flight into the volcano has an iconic relationship to the line of 
flight that is tangent out of the regime of mythology, since the documentation of this flight is 
another addition to his autobiographical regime of signs, which itself is a resistance against and an 
attempt to escape from the regime of mythology. The fact that he states that this document is for 
Ancash reinforces his rejection of the regime of mythology, as Ancash is not part of that regime, 
but rather part of the new AOR (and this Geryon’s own) narrative.  
The quotation (The Only Secret People Keep) given at the end of the quoted text refers 
to a line from Emily Dicksinson’s poem The Reticent Volcano Keeps (1748), which appears as an 
epigraph to the AOR narrative. The final (and following) line of that poem is “Is Immortality”. 
Ancash, when he explains the beliefs of the villagers of Jucu, states that the Yazcamac return as 
red people with wings, with their weaknesses and mortality burned away. How does Geryon’s 
mortality ‘burn away’ when he flies down the Icchantika? Because Geryon immortalizes himself 
through documentating his life in his autobiography. Thus, he becomes immortal through his 
autobiography. Accordingly, through creating his autobiography Geryon has found a way to 
deterritorialize himself and his line of flight consequently leads him out of the regime of 
mythology. This deterritorialization raises several questions. First and foremost it must be made 
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clear where Geryon is traveling to, since his passage out of one regime of signs suggests that he 
has to voyage into another. Secondly, we would want to know the nature of this second regime 
(if we can still speak of a regime at all). Perhaps this regime corresponds best with how Deleuze 
and Guattari define a post-signifying regime: 
 
What happens in the second regime, by comparison with the signifying regime as we have 
already defined it? In the first place, a sign or packet of signs detaches from the irradiating circular 
network and sets to work on its own account, starts running a straight line, as though 
swept into a narrow, open passage. Already the signifying system drew a line of flight or 
deterritorialization exceeding the specific index of its deterritorialized signs, but the 
system gave that line a negative value and sent the scapegoat fleeing down it. Here, it 
seems that the line receives a positive sign as though it were effectively occupied and 
followed by a people who find in it their reason for being or destiny. (141) 
 
Geryon, through creating his autobiography has traced the line out of the regime of mythology, 
and, like Deleuze and Guattari state, it seems that the line receives a ‘positive’ sign, but the 
situation is more complex. “This is how things are in the passional regime, or the regime of 
subjectification. There is no longer a center of signifiance connected to expanding circles or an 
expanding spiral, but a point of subjectification constituting the point of departure of the line” 
(148). Geryon’s point of subjectification coincides with the creation of his autobiography: it is the 
starting point from which he decides to flee from the regime of mythology. But through creating 
his own biography, something else is happening: he does not escape mythology itself. His 
autobiography tells a new and incomplete story, which has gaps, is a fragmented image, and 
which will travel along with Geryon as he travels on (there is no necessary ending point to the 
voyage of this sign). Mythology travels with Geryon not only because of his unavoidable indexical 
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relationship through his name, but rather that he is consequently bound to create more mythology 
through this autobiography.  
This is pertinent because it sheds an important insight into the nature of mythology, as it 
now appears to have what we could call a pragmatic function. The union of these two terms needs 
to be explained by first explaining each term individually. Deleuze and Guattari divide pragmatics 
into having a generative and a transformational component. The generative component “shows how 
the various abstract regimes form concrete mixed semiotics, with what variants, how they 
combine, and which one is predominant” (161). Mythology, as we have seen in the case of AOR, 
possesses this generative component as it mixes different semiotics (its own narrative with that of 
the Geryoneis), but it is important to note that mythology can only do this when they are a 
semiotics with a history. Mythology needs historicity in the semiotics it works with in order to 
have an incomplete image to work with. This is why not all fiction can be mythical, and why 
Barthes stated that mythology has not a ‘natural’ but rather a historical origin. The 
transformational component “shows how these regimes of signs are translated into each other, 
especially when there is a creation of a new regime” (161). This too is relevant in our case, as 
mythology can split the sign into its two halves, and recharge the signifier with a different 
signified, while never fully letting go of whatever signified that was previously attached to it, 
avoiding any kind of saturation point in the signified. The term function in Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s terminology refers to that which “has only ‘traits,’ of content or expression, between 
which it establishes a connection: it is no longer even possible to tell what is a particle and what is 
a sign” (164). These traits are, then, its specific generative and transformative pragmatics.  
What I then propose is that myth, in the sense of it possessing a pragmatic function, is 
what Deleuze and Guattari call an abstract machine:  
 
An abstract machine in itself is not physical or corporeal, any more than it is semiotic; it is 
diagrammatic (it knows nothing of the distinction between the artificial and the natural 
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either). It operates by matter, not by substance; by function, not by form. Substances and 
forms are of expression "or" of content. But functions are not yet "semiotically" formed, 
and matters are not yet "physically" formed. The abstract machine is pure Matter-
Function - a diagram independent of the forms and substances, expressions and contents 
it will distribute. (163-164) 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, expression “constitutes indexes, icons, or symbols that enter regimes 
or semiotic systems”, whereas the content “constitutes bodies, things, or objects that enter 
physical systems” (165). Secondly the difference between substance and matter is the following: 
“Substance is a formed matter, and matter is a substance that is unformed either semiotically or 
physically” (164). These distinctions are of value when we try to conceive the abstract machine. 
As the abstract machine itself is not a physical nor semiotic sign system, but an aspect or even a 
moment, where only the pragmatic traits of expression or content remain in function and matter. 
Consequently, this diagrammatic function of mythology allows for us to move from it having 
solely a representational function (in which both expression and content are necessary elements 
semiotically formed in substance). Mythology is diagrammatic because, as we have seen, it is 
capable of a deterritorialization of a sign from one regime to another, and is able to combine it 
with a different regime. By theorizing mythology as diagrammatic in this way, it moves from its 
mimetic function (which a postsignifying regime possesses) towards a simulative one: “The 
diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather 
constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality” (164).  
We have seen this diagrammatic (deterritorializing) function of myth in the creation of 
Geryon’s autobiography, but we can now also conclude that a deterritorializing movement out of 
one regime of mythology is not the same as escaping from mythology as an abstract machine. We 
can even explain the statement found on the back cover (‘to live past your myth is a perilous 
thing’) of the sequel to AOR, Red Doc> now, because to live past one’s mythological regime is 
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something very different from the idea of living past the idea of mythology as an abstract 
machine.     
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Conclusions 
Arguably one of the more common struggles in literary scholarship is finding a balance between 
close reading a text in such a way that you can give new insights into the text one is studying, 
while simultaneously being confronted with the fact what one’s close reading might say in the 
grand scheme of things. Whereas I originally set out to research what makes something 
‘mythological’ and whether mythology could be produced, we are also dealing with a specific case 
study, AOR, which is a postmodern text. What postmodernism and mythology have in common 
is that they are both reflexive, but in different ways. As we have seen, mythology has long been 
regarded for its mimetic relationship within the society/community in which it operates. 
Postmodernism, on the other hand, as defined in Hutcheon’s terms, is “not a study of mimetic 
mirroring or subjective projecting, but an exploration of the way in which narratives and images 
structure how we see ourselves and how we construct our notions of self, in the present and in 
the past” (2002: 7). What happens then, when mythology and postmodernism cross boundaries? 
If we are to study how narratives and images structure how we see ourselves and construct our 
notions of self, is it not inescapable that the mimetic or representational aspects of those 
narratives and images come under close scrutiny? What requires particular attention in Hucheon’s 
statement is her use of ‘see’ and ‘notion’. What these terms suggest is a linguistic distance 
between readers and texts, where the postmodernist text, when it problematizes its own 
ontological status, allows for the readers to reflect on the text, themselves, and finally on the 
relationship between themselves and this text. This approach suggests language can function as an 
intermediate, since an image or notion of the self is something different from the self it-self. This 
would mean that we have three elements: the text, the notion of the self that we have constructed 
through exploring how we may relate the text to ourselves, and the self itself. This is why 
Hutcheon disregards mimetic mirroring/subjective projecting, as in that case the central question 
would be how these subjects are represented, rather than focusing on our own relationship with 
the text. But Hutcheon’s analysis leaves out two key aspects. The first is that, while it certainly 
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can be of value to explore how a text aids us in constructing our notion of the self, any literary 
experience is also affective, which I contest is not something that could be captured in language in 
a holistic or absolute sense of that experience. As such, to come back to the three designated 
elements (text, notion of self, self), the text can affectively work directly in on the self in a way 
that defies or goes beyond denomination. Postmodern texts are in no way exempt from affective 
experience. For example, when a reader would first read Carson’s translation/reworking of 
Stesichoros’ fragments, the hermeneutic paranoia this unleashes in considering their accuracy is 
certainly an affective one. The second aspect is that any notion of the self that we may construct 
is itself also another text (especially when documented in some way). Consequently we could then 
take that text, and approach why we constructed this notion in the first place, based on the 
previous one, construct another text, and repeat this process again and again. This calls to mind 
Deleuze and Guattari’s statement that every sign simply signifies another sign ad infinitum, 
although it differs as well. Every notion of the self we construct is inherently mimetic, since, as it 
is a notion of that self it has to represent (a part of) that self. It is simulative because this new text 
in turn will signify to us, setting in motion a process (or rather, take part in a process that is 
already continuously underway) of establishing new relationships between signs and their 
respective regimes we as self-as-signs are a part of. This causes the signs to be continuously de- 
and reterritorialized. This process shows us in a microcosm the complex relationship between 
representation and simulation. Although often thought of or explained in terms of being each 
other’s opposites, I find this to be erroneous. This is why we can say can we move from 
representation to simulation; simulation should be understood as a framework in which 
representation takes place.  
 Perhaps it was a realization of this kind that in part prompted Barthes to write Mythologies. 
Barthes was in a sense ahead of his time when he made the link between meaning and form as 
existing in one and the same place, sequentially alternating, which already leans towards Deleuze’s 
and Guattari’s notion that every sign is simply one sign within a longer chain of signs. For 
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Barthes, the fact that a complete sign constituted a meaning, yet was again a signifier on another 
level of language, lead him to an understanding that perspective and approach were crucial in 
understanding our experience of this linguistic intermediary, which in his theory translated into a 
kind of continuous semiotic and intertextual awareness: everything signifies if we approach these 
chains as signifiation, that is, actively subject ourselves to signification. But what my analysis of 
AOR through the ideas presented in Mythologies revealed is that one can also approach the self as 
sign. A sign that travels, both through history and different Texts. This idea of the self-as-sign 
would become of great interest to Barthes in his later work. Writings such as Camera Lucida 
(1980) and the postmodern autobiography Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes (1975) see Barthes 
moving towards increasingly personal subject matter, from the passing away of his mother and 
the experience of the photographs of her related to his childhood, to an autobiography in which 
Barthes would approach himself as Text. Barthes would become critical of Mythologies, deeming 
his analyses in the book to suffer rhetorically from using a methodology that itself was already 
connotative. But this does not mean Barthes’ interest in mythology itself would diminish. 
Barthes’ approach towards his own past was not intended to demythify himself, but rather to gain 
an increasing understanding of himself as Text operating intertextually. This development does 
not reject the way postmodernity traverses the boundaries between Text and reality through a 
linguistic intermediate space, but rather adds to that, that the Text constitutes not just to the way 
we “structure” the way we see the self our construct our notions of that self, but that it also 
constitutes the experience of that self. In this light, Girard’s statement that there is no term in 
language free of mythological connotations, and Meletinsky’s statements that every important 
social phenomena is rooted in mythology, start to signify differently. For both Girard and 
Meletinsky, mythology was primarily mimetic, representational of the world but ultimately 
separated from it through the notion of a boundary between fiction and reality. Yet, if it is the 
direct constitution of our experience, the constant play in distance between meaning and form, 
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that has come under the sphere of influence of mythology, the idea of limiting the presence of 
mythology to that of a mimetic presence cannot suffice anymore.  
 It is here that I would like to return to AOR.  I briefly touched upon the notion of 
Barthes’ enterprise in penning his autobiography, which was not to be understood in terms of an 
attempt at demythification. As we have seen in the course of this study, it is specifically the 
autobiography that will mythologize. Why the autobiography? Much like mythology, any 
autobiography starts in a ‘primordial’ rather than an empirical time. Autobiographical writing 
cannot but be reflective: it happens after the event, has to represent it. Photography happens in the 
moment, it seeks to capture that moment in the photograph. Is this the reason why Geryon 
creates a photographic autobiography? A series of documents, which could fictionally represent a 
specific time and place within an empirical timeline? No, for whatever is captured in the 
photograph is a fragment, signifying a chain of signs and events, a larger story, which the 
specificity of the medium does not allow to be shown. As such, a photographic autobiography 
will always mythologize. Like Stesichoros’ Geryoneis, what is left to the reader is a collection of 
fragments of a life. Apart from the fragmentary nature, we have also been dealing with linguistic 
representations of photographic representations. This only adds to the mythologization. Not only 
do we realize that we are presented with images that, even when collected, represent to us an 
incomplete narrative, but are even further removed from them since they are presented to us in a 
different medium (language). Through this double-representation, we are even further removed 
from the actual image, and yet at the same time closer because the linguistic representation 
signifies on its own account. 
The final photograph in AOR is dubbed ‘# 1748’ and prefaced with the sentence “It is a 
photograph he never took, no one here took it” (145). The photograph was apparently not taken 
by Geryon, yet there it is in the autobiography. This cannot but signify to us: who then took it? 
How did it end up in the autobiography? And so on. There is an iconic relationship here to the 
three verse lines of Stesichoros’ Palinode (‘this is not a true story…”), for if his slander of Helen 
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was not the reason why he went blind, then what was it? And if his writing of this verse was not 
the cure for his blindness, then what was? The very fact that we are asking these questions, or can 
ask them invokes Deleuze and Guattari: “Writing now functions on the same level as the real, 
and the real materiality writes” (164). In chapter 3 we made the distinction between matter as 
semiotically unformed substance, and substance as semiotically formed matter. Deleuze and 
Guattari here do not mean that matter, which is semiotically unformed, does not signify; on the 
contrary, something that is semiotically unformed certainly signifies, but what matters is that this 
does not necessarily result in a semiotically formed substance (the way a sign, in order to be 
complete, consists out of a signifier and a signified). Understood in this way, we must understand 
Deleuze and Guattari in the sense that the signification of matter is affective. This is why we 
must not think of simulation and representation as taking places on two separate planes or levels 
of reality:  
 
“Abstract machines do not exist only on the plane of consistency [as immanent matter-
function], upon which they develop diagrams; they are already present enveloped or 
“encasted” in the strata [both the plane of expression and that of content] in general, or 
even erected on particular strata upon which they simultaneously organize a form of 
expression [indexes, icons, symbols] and a form of content [bodies, things, objects]. What 
is illusory in the second case is the idea of an exclusively expressive or language-based 
abstract machine, not the idea of an abstract machine internal to the stratum and 
accounting for the relativity of those two distinct forms [the form of content and the 
form of expression]. (167) 
 
I previously explained simulation as the framework in which representation takes place, Deleuze 
and Guattari explain it inversely, as they state that the abstract machine are already enveloped in 
the strata in which representation takes place. This why we can move from representation to 
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simulation.  The reason why they say an abstract machine cannot be exclusively language-based 
(even though it does work with signs or substance) is because, if its deterritorializing and 
reterritorializing traits would be exclusively language-based, solely expressive and not affective, a 
smooth approach to textual space (as a space of affects) would not be possible. 
 As Deleuze and Guattari state, the diagram “knows nothing of the distinction between 
the artificial and the natural” (164). This lack of distinction shows why mythology, as an abstract 
machine, is capable of reterritorializing the questions given above into the real, because it denies 
the distinction or separation between a plane of content and a plane of expression and draws 
only a single plane of consistency (where a constant de- and territorialization takes place, 
alternating between semiotically formed substance, into semiotically unformed matter). In the 
case of mythology this gets even more complicated because it can never be natural, but has to be 
historical and fragmentary, in order for it to be able to distort. Because this distinction between 
the artificial (or a diachronic reconstruction of a myth) and the natural has ceased to be 
acknowledged in the abstract machine, a diagrammatic reterritorialization of mythological 
questions into the real has now become possible. 
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